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CREATING AN ‘UNDEVELOPED LANDS 
PROTECTION ACT’ FOR FARMLANDS, 
FORESTS, AND NATURAL AREAS 
TERENCE J. CENTNER 
SUMMARY 
Under nuisance law, bothersome activities conducted on 
farmlands, forests, and natural areas are being enjoined.  The 
cessation of activities on these lands is sometimes detrimental to the 
ecology of an area or the continued economic viability of agronomic 
pursuits.  As a result, some of our nation’s farmlands, forests, and 
natural areas are unnecessarily being lost to development.  Because 
positive attributes of undeveloped areas are undervalued, the 
environmental community might lend support to owners of these 
lands in the form of a more forceful defense against nuisance lawsuits.  
Drawing upon an economy of nature, new legislation called an 
“Undeveloped Lands Protection Act” is proposed.  Ecological and 
civic-societal objectives are incorporated in a legislative proposal that 
would offer owners of undeveloped lands greater protection against 
nuisance lawsuits.  The anti-nuisance legislative response is intended 
to foster a debate that will lead to greater protection for our natural 
resources. 
INTRODUCTION 
The farm community and agribusiness firms have long 
championed right-to-farm legislation to preclude nuisance lawsuits 
from adversely affecting their activities and businesses (see Appendix 
1).1  Agriculture was recognized as different from other business 
 
 1. See, e.g., Margaret Rosso Grossman & Thomas G. Fischer, Protecting the Right to 
Farm: Statutory Limits on Nuisance Actions Against the Farmer, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 95, 117-30 
(discussing the early right-to-farm statutes); NEIL D. HAMILTON, A LIVESTOCK PRODUCERS 
LEGAL GUIDE TO: NUISANCE, LAND USE CONTROL, AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1992) 
(delineating a comprehensive analysis of nuisance law and issues); Jacqueline P. Hand, Right-to-
Farm Laws: Breaking New Ground in the Preservation of Farmland, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 289, 
305-06 (1984) (concluding that right-to-farm statutes reverse the preference for development 
under traditional nuisance law to favor the less intensive use of land). 
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activities and deserving of special dispensation.2  The protection in 
many early right-to-farm laws was to cover the growing and 
harvesting of crops, the feeding, breeding, and management of 
livestock, and other agricultural and horticultural uses.3  Some laws 
sought to preserve farmland from urban sprawl.4  Over the 
subsequent decades, right-to-farm laws were amended to expand 
protection to business and service activities including marketing 
operations and processors.5 
The scope of many right-to-farm laws suggests that farm 
organizations and agribusiness firms have been successful in achieving 
special legislative dispensation for agriculture.6  The anti-nuisance 
exception, moreover, benefits agriculture and society.7  
Simultaneously, right-to-farm laws may cause producers to be less 
sensitive to neighbors’ rights,8 reduce the efficient allocation of land 
use entitlements,9 intrude on the property rights of neighbors,10 and 
 
 2. See, e.g., C. Ford Runge, Environmental Protection from Farm to Market, in THINKING 
ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 200-16 (Marian R. 
Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997) (claiming that agriculture is different for environmental 
protection programs); Neil D. Hamilton, Right-to-Farm Laws Reconsidered: Ten Reasons Why 
Legislative Efforts to Resolve Agricultural Nuisances May Be Ineffective, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 
103, 105 (1998) (noting that right-to-farm laws are a popular form of pro-agriculture legislation 
at the state level). 
 3. E.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/2 (2002).  However, the major thrust of the 
legislation was to protect existing farm investments by reducing actions under nuisance law that 
enjoined agricultural activities.  Hand, supra note 1, at 305-06 (observing a priority for 
agricultural uses). 
 4. See Grossman & Fischer, supra note 1, at 152 (observing that the laws protect farmland 
by limiting nuisance relief). 
 5. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 41-1-7 (1997 & Supp. 2006) (protecting the processing and 
packaging of eggs, the manufacturing of feed for poultry or livestock, and food and forest 
products processing plants); NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-4403 (Supp. 2005) (adding protection for grain 
warehouses); see also Terence J. Centner, Anti-nuisance Legislation: Can the Derogation of 
Common Law Nuisance Be a Taking?, 30 ENVTL. L. RPTR. 10253, 10255 (2000) (identifying 
several statutes that delineate broad expansion of protected activities by right-to-farm laws). 
 6. See, e.g., David R. Bliss, Tilting at Wind Turbines: Noise Nuisance in the Neighborhood 
After Rassier v. Houim, 69 N. DAK. L. REV. 535, 540 (1993) (observing that most states confer 
special dispensation on agricultural producers through their right-to-farm laws). 
 7. Grossman & Fischer, supra note 1, at 141 (predicting that right-to-farm laws would 
support continued agricultural production and a strong state economy); Hand, supra note 1, at 
305 (suggesting that society reaps social benefits by keeping land in agricultural production 
under right-to-farm laws). 
 8. Joshua M. Duke & Scott A. Malcolm, Legal Risk in Agriculture: Right-to-Farm Laws 
and Institutional Change, 75 AGRIC. SYSTEMS 295, 299 (2003) (noting that farmers may believe 
they are protected against injunctions for nuisances, so they are not as concerned about how 
their practices affect their neighbors). 
 9. See Alexander A. Reinert, Note, The Right to Farm: Hog-Tied and Nuisance-Bound, 73 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1694, 1695 (1998) (maintaining that neighboring properties have a reduced 
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protect operations that contribute to the degradation of rural 
landscapes.11  While modern nuisance law has moved toward flexible 
mediation by courts,12 right-to-farm laws rely on wrongfulness of land 
use.13  The laws may also constitute a significant obstacle to common 
law remedies against farms14 or to local governments’ ability to 
regulate land use options.15 
Over the years, right-to-farm laws have faced a number of 
challenges,16 with the most significant being constitutional challenges 
that the laws go too far in denigrating the rights of others.17  The 
 
choice of options for the use of lands burdened by adjacent nuisance activities under right-to-
farm laws). 
 10. See Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 316 (Iowa 1998), cert. denied, 525 
U.S. 1172 (1999). Permitted intrusions have been called easements.  Id. 
 11. See Reinert, supra note 9, at 1738 (expressing concern that right-to-farm laws offer too 
much protection to farmers). 
 12. Robert H. Cutting, “One Man’s Ceilin’ is Another Man’s Floor”: Property Rights as the 
Double-Edged Sword, 31 ENVTL. L. 819, 868 (2001) (noting that flexibility in the common law of 
nuisance allows courts discretion in weighing equities). 
 13. Nuisance law may consider the wrongfulness of the defendant’s land use for the 
location to adopt one-sided solutions of either an injunction or allowing the defendant’s 
interference to continue.  Reinert, supra note 9, at 1699-1703.  This response means that right-
to-farm laws can fail to consider the efficient allocation of resources.  Id. at 1738. 
 14. See, e.g., David Osterberg & David Wallinga, Addressing Externalities From Swine 
Production to Reduce Public Health and Environmental Impacts, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1703, 
1707 (2004) (suggesting that right-to-farm laws may shield concentrated animal feeding 
operations that are causing adverse public health impacts); James B. Ruhl, Farms, Their 
Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 316 (2000) (claiming 
that right-to-farm laws are an obstacle to environmental remedies). 
 15. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 286.474(6) (West 2003 & Supp. 2006) (preempting local 
ordinances and regulations); 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 953 (West 2006) (prohibiting local 
governments from adopting unauthorized local ordinances).  See also Wendy K. Walker, Note, 
Whole Hog: The Pre-Emption of Local Control by the 1999 Amendment to the Michigan Right to 
Farm Act, 36 VAL. U.L. REV. 461, 476-95 (2002) (criticizing the Michigan right-to-farm law and 
its preclusion of local control). 
 16. See Centner, supra note 5, at 10253 (noting that right-to-farm laws have presumably 
stopped a great number of nuisance lawsuits from being filed yet simultaneously have not 
stopped nuisance lawsuits concerning operations and activities that predate neighboring land 
uses). 
 17. See Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 321 (Iowa 1998) (interpreting 
IOWA CODE § 352.11 (1993) as effecting a taking); Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 
175-77 (Iowa 2004) (interpreting the immunity provided by IOWA CODE § 657.11(2) (1999) as 
violating art. I, § 1 of the Iowa Constitution).  See also Terence J. Centner, Governmental and 
Unconstitutional Takings: When Do Right-to-Farm Laws Go Too Far?, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 87 (2006) (evaluating constitutional challenges to right-to-farm laws to suggest the 
enactment of laws based upon an economy of nature); Jesse J. Richardson, Jr. & Theodore A. 
Feitshans, Nuisance Revisited After Buchanan and Bormann, 5 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 121, 128 
(2000) (categorizing types of right-to-farm laws). 
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Supreme Court of Iowa found Iowa Code section 352.1118 
unconstitutional in Bormann v. Board of Supervisors19 and Iowa Code 
section 657.1120 unconstitutional in Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C.21  
Although the decisions are based on the Iowa Constitution22 and 
distinguished from other right-to-farm laws, the precedents should 
concern other states.23  People unhappy with the anti-nuisance 
protection accorded by right-to-farm laws could initiate lawsuits 
based upon the constitutional concerns enumerated in Bormann and 
Gacke.24  Given the importance of right-to-farm laws to agricultural 
business operations, an alternate approach might be advisable. 
This article presents  an “Undeveloped Lands Protection Act,” 
(ULPA) a new anti-nuisance paradigm for the protection of lands 
used as farmland, forestry, and natural areas.25  Drawing upon an 
economy of nature, ecological and civic-societal objectives are 
incorporated into ULPA, a uniform act that supplements existing 
right-to-farm legislation by offering special protection for natural 
resources.26  The distinction is that the current anti-nuisance 
protection for marketplace investments may not provide sufficient 
 
 18. IOWA CODE § 352.11 (1993). 
 19. 584 N.W.2d 309, 321 (Iowa 1998). 
 20. IOWA CODE § 657.11 (1999). 
 21. 684 N.W.2d 168, 173 (Iowa 2004). 
 22. The Bormann decision found that Iowa Code section 352.11 was a per se taking under 
the Iowa and federal constitutions.  584 N.W.2d at 321-22.  Arguments exist that the challenged 
law would not violate the U.S. Constitution.  See Centner, supra note 17, at 120-21.  The Iowa 
court declined to make a similar conclusion in  Gacke.  Gacke, 684 N.W.2d at 174.  Rather, the 
Iowa Supreme Court relied only on the Iowa Constitution.  Id. 
 23. See Centner, supra note 17, at 145-46 (identifying the protection of nuisances from 
certain business activities as affecting a regulatory taking); Centner, supra note 5, at 10258-60 
(suggesting that the Bormann decision should not lead to the demise of the nuisance protection 
afforded by most right-to-farm laws). 
 24. But see Pure Air and Water, Inc. v. Davidsen, No. 2690-97 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 25, 1999) 
(finding that the New York right-to-farm law did not effect an unconstitutional taking); Moon v. 
N. Idaho Farmers Ass’n, 96 P.3d 637, 646 (Idaho 2004) (concluding that an Idaho statute was 
not offensive to the federal or state takings clauses); Overgaard v. Rock County Bd. of 
Comm’rs, No. 02-601, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13001, at *20-22 (D. Minn. July 25, 2003) 
(differentiating facts from those present in the Bormann case to conclude no unconstitutional 
deprivation of property). 
 25. See Undeveloped Lands Protection Act (hereinafter ULPA), infra app. 2. 
 26. An analysis of constitutional challenges to right-to-farm laws has already discussed the 
reasons for advocating a new anti-nuisance paradigm in the form of an Undeveloped Lands 
Protection Act.  See Centner, supra note 17, at 141-45 (evaluating constitutional challenges).  
See also infra note 71 and accompanying text 
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protection for natural resources.27  The object of the new paradigm is 
to offer a separate, more forceful defense against nuisance lawsuits 
for qualifying land resources.28  Due to the amenities offered by 
undeveloped lands, greater protection might be available to protect 
and preserve these resources.29  While the paradigm does not address 
the need for greater governmental involvement in land preservation, 
it seeks to influence the economics of land conversion by providing 
further assurance that necessary activities relating to undeveloped 
land use may continue.30 
I.  LAND RESOURCES VERSUS INVESTMENTS 
The accepted nomenclature of “right-to-farm laws” offers a 
description of the intent of these anti-nuisance statutes.31  Legislatures 
intended that agricultural pursuits continue due to the investments in 
facilities and the contributions that agricultural production makes to 
local economies.32  Farmers were entitled to continue farming despite 
 
 27. See Andrea Ross, Justifying Environmental Regulation, 8 HUME PAPERS ON PUB. 
POL’Y 6, 7 (2000) (maintaining that there is no market for environmental amenities so that they 
are not valued sufficiently to prevent their demise); Duke & Malcolm, supra note 8, at 302 
(observing that uncertainty as to whether right-to-farm laws providing anti-nuisance protection 
detracts from their effectiveness and recommending further efforts to clarify rights).  The 
Undeveloped Lands Protection Act seeks to offer more protection to activities on undeveloped 
lands by excluding protection for business activities.  See tit. III(A), infra app. 2. 
 28. A few of the state right-to-farm laws already offer this protection.  See, e.g., KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 2-3202 (2001) (protecting agricultural activities that are consistent with good agricultural 
practices and established prior to surrounding nonagricultural activities).  Others, however, are 
more comprehensive and seem to offer protection based on a marketplace economy.  See 
Centner, supra note 5, at 10255 (citing statutes that protect business activities). 
 29. See  infra notes 82-93 and accompanying text. 
 30. This might be achieved through land use controls, such as the agricultural zoning 
statutes of Hawaii and Oregon.  HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 205-1 to -18 (LexisNexis 2005) 
(establishing a state land use commission with land being placed in one of four use districts); 
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 215.203–.298 (2005), available at http://www.leg.state.or.us/ors/215.html 
(allowing zoning ordinances “to zone designated areas of land within the county as exclusive 
farm use zones”).  See also Racelle Alterman, The Challenge of Farmland Preservation, 63 J. 
AM. PLANNING ASSN. 220, 221-35 (1997) (comparing farmland preservation in the United 
States with several other countries to enunciate the distinction that other countries control 
permission on converting farmland while governments in the United States address economic 
incentives to retain farmland). 
 31. They were intended to allow farmers to continue to farm despite objectionable 
nuisance activities. 
 32. See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/1 (West 2002) (noting that Illinois’ Farm 
Nuisance Suit Act is intended to encourage investments in farm improvements and avoid the 
cessation of operations); Herrin v. Opatut, 281 S.E.2d 575, 577 (Ga. 1981) (citing the Georgia 
right-to-farm law and the concern about agricultural operations being discouraged from making 
investments and ceasing production). 
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the nuisances they created and the problems their activities caused to 
neighbors.33  Many of the laws adopted a “coming to the nuisance” 
doctrine whereby existing agricultural activities could continue only if 
the nuisance was created due to people moving to the existing 
activity.34  Under the doctrine, less protection is afforded people who 
move next to existing activities due to the fact that the property’s 
value already reflects the impairment.35  People moving to the 
countryside should accept some of the negative spin-offs of existing 
agricultural production.36 
Some of the right-to-farm laws moved beyond the coming to the 
nuisance doctrine to offer protection to new agricultural activities.37  
The distinction is most important.38  Under the classic right-to-farm 
law, the protection offered is based on priorities of land uses.39  If a 
farm engages in activities prior to the arrival of neighbors who find 
the activities objectionable, the farm has a defense against nuisance 
lawsuits.40  The special dispensation is for existing operations at the 
expense of neighboring property owners who might later want to 
 
 33. The protection varied upon the provisions adopted by the legislative body.  See infra 
notes 37-44 and accompanying text. 
 34. See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/1 (West 2002) (noting the problem of 
nonagricultural land uses extending into agricultural areas). 
 35. See Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of Modern 
Environmental Policy, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 923, 933-34 (1999) (discussing the coming to the 
nuisance doctrine and the belief that people who move next to a nuisance should not benefit). 
 36. See Herrin v. Opatut, 281 S.E.2d 575, 578 (Ga. 1981) (observing that the Georgia right-
to-farm law offered protection against nuisance lawsuits where changes in land uses on 
surrounding land caused an agricultural facility to become a nuisance). 
 37. See IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 22-4801 to -4804 (2001 & Supp. 2005) (allowing the “open 
burning of crop residue grown in agricultural fields”); IOWA CODE § 352.11 (1993) (exempting 
farm operations from nuisance suits regardless of when activity commences);  IOWA CODE § 
657.11(4) (1999) (exempting animal feeding operations from nuisance suits regardless of when 
activity commences).  These Iowa Code provisions were respectively found unconstitutional in 
Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 321 (Iowa 1998) (overturning § 352.11) and 
Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 175-77 (Iowa 2004) (overturning § 657.11(4)). 
 38. Right-to-farm laws can potentially eliminate the equitable foundation whereby a 
neighboring objectionable activity should be enjoined.  
 39. See, e.g., Swedenberg v. Phillips, 562 So.2d 170, 172-73 (Ala. 1990) (concluding the 
right-to-farm law had no application because the plaintiffs resided on their property prior to the 
construction of the defendant’s chicken house). 
 40. Many of the right-to-farm laws required activities to exist at least one year prior to 
changed conditions in the neighborhood.  See, e.g.,  740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/3 (West 
2002) (exempting farms from nuisance suits arising due to “any changed conditions in the 
surrounding area occurring after the farm has been in operation for more than one year, when 
such farm was not a nuisance at the time it began operation”). 
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commence land uses incompatible with the established agricultural 
uses.41 
Statutes that go beyond the coming to the nuisance doctrine 
require neighboring property owners to accept new nuisance-
generating activities.42  Rather than protecting investments of existing 
property owners, these laws denigrate property rights of people next 
to those commencing new nuisance activities.43  It was this 
interference with neighbors’ property rights that was found by the 
Iowa Supreme Court to go too far so that two right-to-farm statutes 
were unconstitutional.44 
A. Going Beyond Nuisance Law 
While some right-to-farm laws may embody an equitable 
resolution of competing interests, the overriding issue is whether 
 
 41. For example, the Indiana Court of Appeals considered the application of a statutory 
coming to the nuisance provision in Erbrich Products Co. v. Wills, 509 N.E.2d 850, 859-60 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1987) (considering IND. CODE § 34-1-52-4(f) (1982)).  Nearby neighbors brought a 
lawsuit against a manufacturing facility with a nuisance cause of action.  Erbrich, 509 N.E.2d at 
852.  The defendant moved for summary judgment on the nuisance claim due to the coming to 
the nuisance provision of the state’s anti-nuisance law.  Id. at 858; IND. CODE § 34-1-52-4(f).  In 
analyzing the evidence, the appellate court found that the defendant had established 
qualification under the law.  Erbrich., 509 N.E.2d at 859.  The defendant’s operations had not 
changed significantly since it commenced operation in 1932 in an industrial/commercial 
neighborhood.  Id.  After the defendant commenced operations, the neighborhood began to 
develop as a residential neighborhood.  Id.  Because these residential land users came to the 
nuisance, the defendant qualified for summary judgment under the anti-nuisance law.  Id. at 
859-60. 
 42. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 22-4801 (2001 & Supp. 2005) (providing a safe harbor for farmers 
burning crop residue); IOWA CODE ANN. § 352.11(1)(a) (West 2001 & Supp. 2006) (granting 
protection against nuisance lawsuits regardless of the established date of operation or expansion 
of the agricultural activities); IOWA CODE ANN. § 657.11(1)-(2) (West 1998 & Supp. 2006) 
(granting protection against nuisance lawsuits to promote the expansion of animal agriculture); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 561.19, subdiv. 2(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006) (stating that an agricultural 
operation is not a nuisance if it has been operating two years and meets statutory qualifications); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 95-3-29(1) (2004) (providing an absolute defense to nuisance actions to 
operations operating one year if the conditions or circumstances alleged to constitute a nuisance 
have existed substantially unchanged since the established date of operation); 3 PA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 954(a) (West 1995 & Supp. 2006) (providing a statute of limitations against nuisance actions 
where an agricultural operation meets statutory qualifications); TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 
251.004(a) (Vernon 2004 & Supp. 2006) (using a statute of limitations to extinguish nuisance 
rights).; See also S.B. 26, 148th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2005), available at 
http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2005_06/pdf/sb26.pdf  (proposing to extend anti-nuisance 
protection to poultry and meat by-product facilities). 
 43. Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 316 (finding that an Iowa right-to-farm law created an 
easement). 
 44. Id. at 321; Gacke, 684 N.W.2d at 179 (finding an oppressive effect on neighboring 
property owners). 
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legislatures should be attempting to grant exceptions from common 
law nuisance law.45  Why shouldn’t courts simply employ nuisance law 
to resolve conflicting interests?46  One justification for relief from 
nuisance law involves the difficult hurdles for plaintiffs faced with 
establishing proof of pollution from specific properties.47  Thus, 
legislatures enacted environmental legislation.48  Second, because 
nuisance law was found to be inadequate as a mechanism for reducing 
or controlling objectionable activities and practices, further 
governmental intervention has occurred.49  Legislatures enacted land 
use statutes and zoning regulations to assign rights and govern 
conflicting interests.50 
 
 45. From an economic perspective, some scholars have advanced a return to free market 
environmentalism based upon the superiority of private property and free markets which would 
require the repeal of environmental laws.  See, e.g., Norman W. Spaulding, III, Note, 
Commodification and Its Discontents: Environmentalism and the Promise of Market Incentives, 
16 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 293, 294 (1997). 
 46. This arguably would be similar to a return to free market environmentalism, except 
that nuisance law already requires governmental interference to delineate rights.  See Gary D. 
Meyers & Simone C. Muller, The Ethical Implications, Political Ramifications and Practical 
Limitations of Adopting Sustainable Development as National and International Policy, 4 BUFF. 
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 29-30 (1996) (observing some of the criticisms of free market environmentalism). 
 47. See J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution 
of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407, 1455 
(1997) (noting difficulties in proof of causation, fault, injury, and damages). 
 48. See Leslie Salt Co. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 200 Cal. Rptr. 
575, 583 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that legislation concerning the placement of unauthorized 
fill into waters involved the governmental regulation of nuisances under an environmental 
statute). 
 49. See Andrew Jackson Heimert, Keeping Pigs Out of Parlors: Using Nuisance Law to 
Affect the Location of Pollution, 27 ENVTL. L. 403, 415 (1997) (noting that nuisance law was 
unable to reduce pollution to optimal levels); Glenn P. Sugameli, Takings Bills Threaten Private 
Property, People, and the Environment, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 521, 560 (1997) 
(commenting that pollution controls were enacted due to the inability of nuisance law to protect 
health and property).  Moreover, environmental legislation generally was not intended to 
preempt common law nuisance actions.  See Greater Westchester Homeowners Ass’n v. City of 
Los Angeles, 603 P.2d 1329, 1336 (Cal. 1979) (holding that claims for personal injuries founded 
upon nuisance were not federally preempted by the Federal Aviation Act); Leo v. General 
Electric Co., 538 N.Y.S.2d 844, 847 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (finding that the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act did not preempt common law 
nuisance); GTE Mobilnet of S. Tex. Ltd. P’ship v. Pascouet, 61 S.W.3d 599, 608-12 (Tex. App. 
2001) (finding that the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 did not preempt a nuisance 
claim). 
 50. See, e.g., Alfred Bettman, Constitutionality of Zoning, 37 HARV. L. REV. 834, 837 
(1924) (observing that zoning operates to prevent nuisances); Eric R. Claeys, Takings, 
Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549, 1554 (2003) (observing 
that regulations prevented nuisances); see also Brief on Behalf of National Conference on City 
Planning et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant at 23-30, Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 
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Thus, zoning, land use regulations, and environmental 
regulations already supplement nuisance law to provide resolution for 
many land use conflicts.51  Right-to-farm laws were enacted because 
existing remedies were unable to address the pressures being exerted 
on agricultural producers as residential and commercial land uses 
sprawled into the countryside.52  Right-to-farm laws may be viewed as 
an extension of land use regulations that attempt to resolve conflicts 
created when people move to a nuisance.53  Nuisance law, zoning, and 
anti-nuisance legislation have become accepted parts of our 
jurisprudence. 
A nuisance lawsuit is initiated when a plaintiff complains to a 
court of an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of 
property by a neighbor.54  While the use and enjoyment may involve 
more than economic interests, the resolution of nuisance lawsuits may 
become overly dependent on financial considerations.55  In balancing 
 
U.S. 365 (1926) (justifying zoning under a traditional nuisance-based conception of the police 
power and disclaiming any intention to zone for aesthetic purposes). 
 51. See Andrew Auchincloss Lundgren, Beyond Zoning: Dynamic Land Use Planning in 
the Age of Sprawl, 11 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 101, 124-25 (2004) (discussing zoning as an alternative 
to nuisance law); Ora R. Sheinson, Note, Lessons from the Jewish Law of Property Rights for the 
Modern American Takings Debate, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 483, 524 (2001) (noting zoning was a 
response to environmental and pollution concerns that nuisance law could not adequately 
address); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 
965, 1006 (2004) (noting that nuisance is supplemented by other rules of proper land use such as 
pollution control and zoning); see also Seawall Assoc. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 
1069 (N.Y. 1989) (observing that local laws may be enacted to control nuisance-like activities). 
 52. See Reinert, supra note 9, at 1705 (observing pressures on farmers in the form of rising 
land values and neighbors who object to farming practices); Daniel Diaz & Gary Paul Green, 
Growth Management and Agriculture: An Examination of Local Efforts to Manage Growth and 
Preserve Farmland in Wisconsin Cities, Villages, and Towns, 66 RURAL SOC. 317, 338-39 (2001) 
(concluding that agricultural zoning as a tool for preserving farmland is limited due to the low 
income derived from farming). 
 53. See Crea v. Crea, 16 P.3d 922, 925 (Idaho 2000) (finding that the plaintiffs had not 
moved to the nuisance but rather the expansion of a hog operation caused the nuisance so the 
state’s right-to-farm statute did not apply); Durham v. Britt, 451 S.E.2d 1, 2 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1994) (finding that a turkey farmer who changed to raising hogs created the nuisance so that the 
offensive activity was not protected by the state’s right-to-farm law). 
 54. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 822 (1939) (defining a private nuisance as a 
“non-trespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land”).  The 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS defined a public nuisance as “an unreasonable interference 
with a right common to the general public.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 821B (1997). 
 55. See Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain After Judgment? A 
Glimpse Inside the Cathedral, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 376 (1999) (discussing how nuisance 
examples are employed in analyses of the economics of law); Keith N. Hylton, When Should We 
Prefer Tort Law to Environmental Regulation?, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 515, 525-26 (2002) (opining 
that courts compare externalized costs with benefits to determine whether relief should be 
granted in a nuisance action); George P. Smith II, Nuisance Law: The Morphogenesis of an 
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equities to determine whether to grant injunctive relief in a nuisance 
lawsuit, the expected costs of the damage may be compared to the 
expected costs of abating the damage.56  This reliance on economic 
factors shifts the analysis of nuisance law from an evaluation of the 
violation of antecedent rights to an evaluation of the merits of the 
activities.57 
This reliance on economic considerations may also be at the 
expense of long-term health, civic, moral, aesthetic, and 
environmental concerns.58  Discussions concerning property rights and 
environmental quality have led to the identification of considerations 
beyond economics that may be equally appropriate for addressing 
conflicts.59  Rather than relying on market-based economic concepts, 
greater attention might be focused on the economy of nature and the 
civic economy.60 
The fact that we are a society of laws means that might does not 
make right.61  The protection and preservation of resources may be as 
 
Historical Revisionist Theory of Contemporary Economic Jurisprudence, 74 NEB. L. REV. 658, 
701-02, 740 (1995) (arguing that economic efficiency is the core of a reasonable judicial decision 
and that courts should balance the value of what is obtained versus the value of what is 
sacrificed); Smith, supra note 51, at 967-68 (observing that nuisance lawsuits may be resolved 
using a cost-benefit approach). 
 56. See generally supra note 55. See also Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 873 
(N.Y. 1970) (declining to enjoin the disturbing activities of a cement factory due to the 
investment of the cement company in its facility and the economic benefits to the community); 
Smith, supra note 51, at 968 (noting that dependence on economic considerations may lead to 
the placement of liability on the cheapest cost avoider). 
 57. Id. at 969. 
 58. See Jeffrey A. Berger, Efficient Wireless Tower Siting: An Alternative to Section 
332(C)(7) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 23 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 83, 110-11 
(2004) (discussing causes of action based on aesthetic nuisances); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, The 
Three Economies: An Essay in Honor of Joseph Sax, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 411, 417-20 (1998) 
(offering a comparison of a marketplace economy with an economy of nature). 
 59. See supra note 58.  This also might include the public trust doctrine under which it is 
recognized that private land use should be burdened by the community’s interest in its use and 
enjoyment.  Zachary C. Kleinsasser, Note, Public and Private Property Rights: Regulatory and 
Physical Takings and the Public Trust Doctrine, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 421, 422 (2005). 
 60. The civic economy includes societal concerns.  See Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and 
the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. 
REV. 1433 (1993) (discussing the Lucas  decision and the economy of nature); Zygmunt J.B. 
Plater, Environmental Law and Three Economies: Navigating a Sprawling Field of Study, 
Practice, and Societal Governance in Which Everything is Connected to Everything Else, 23 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 359, 369 (1999) (discussing the civic-societal economy as one that 
considers societal concerns that exist beyond the elements of a marketplace economy). 
 61. See, e.g., Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Beyond the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty: Judicial 
Decision-Making in a Polynomic World, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 781, 809 (2001) (advancing the 
argument that a majority cannot make an immoral, unfair, or unjust rule fair or acceptable).  In 
a similar manner, reliance on economic profit to justify a rule may be misplaced.  Id. 
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important to our future as current economic well-being.62  Our society 
is more than a marketplace driven by economic forces, as an over-
dependence on market forces may be adverse to our quality of life.63  
Given that nuisance law balances equities, it ought to account for 
considerations beyond economics.64  It follows that anti-nuisance 
legislation should be based on additional, noneconomic factors.  
Indeed, objectives include the protection of land resources and the 
production of foodstuffs.65  Two economies have been offered to 
supplement the economic-based marketplace economy; the 
“economy of nature” and the “civic economy.”66  Although all three 
economies overlap to some degree, their distinctions explain why a 
new paradigm is being advanced to supplement right-to-farm laws. 
B. Additional Economies 
The economy of nature views lands from an ecological 
perspective consisting of systems defined by their function.67  Land 
ownership involves a custodial role whereby landowners have 
obligations to non-landowners.68  Property rights accompanying land 
ownership involve the consideration of both the owner’s and the 
community’s interests.69  Under the economy of nature, land consists 
of an intricate complex of living, geophysical systems defined by their 
function.70  Land, in its unaltered state, performs important services.71  
 
 62. See John C. Dernbach, Sustainable Versus Unsustainable Propositions, 53 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 449, 474 (2002) (arguing that laws are necessary for the improvement of the 
quality of life). 
 63. See Ross, supra note 27, at 7-8 (concluding that the marketplace economy allows for 
the impairment of natural resources and environmental amenities). 
 64. This might include aesthetic and historic values.  See, e.g., Stephen Christopher Unger, 
Note, Ancient Lights in Wrigleyville: An Argument for the Unobstructed View of a National 
Pastime, 38 IND. L. REV. 533, 552-60 (2005) (discussing the application of nuisance law to 
preserving views). 
 65. Grossman & Fischer, supra note 1, at 111 (noting that right-to-farm laws were intended 
to preserve farmland); Hand, supra note 1, at 328 (noting that right-to-farm laws, in conjunction 
with other programs, can assist in preserving farmland); Thomas B. McNulty, Comment, The 
Pennsylvanian Farmer Receives No Real Protection From the Pennsylvania Right to Farm Act, 10 
PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 81, 88 (2001) (observing continued food production from farmlands as 
being a significant objective of right-to-farm laws). 
 66. Plater, supra note 60, at 362-74. 
 67. Plater, supra note 58, at 419 (criticizing classification of lands based on manmade 
boundaries). 
 68. See Sax, supra note 60, at 1451 (claiming that contemporary land use management has 
incorporated the notion that property owners have obligations “to protect natural services”). 
 69. Id. at 1453 (addressing the “American experience with navigable waters”). 
 70. Id. at 1442; Plater, supra note 58, at 429. 
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It also intersects and interacts with two other economies: the 
marketplace and civic economies.72  Considerations, including the 
absorption of wastes, mean the economy of nature involves 
externalities that may not be measured in traditional economic 
terms.73 
The civic economy, sometimes called the civic-societal 
economy,74 extends beyond the marketplace economy to cover 
externalized costs, including resources, energy, inputs, outputs, 
values, qualities, and consequences of the life and welfare of human 
society.75  While the importance of externalized costs has long been 
recognized, economic and political pressures often result in many of 
these external factors being marginalized.76  The significance of the 
civic economy is that nuisance law based primarily on a marketplace 
economy will not be giving adequate consideration to externalities 
and the quality of life.77 
Turning to anti-nuisance protection, right-to-farm laws are based 
mainly on a marketplace economy whereby the capital investments in 
infrastructural components of business activities justify an exception 
to nuisance law.78  The laws generally do not separate the economic 
factors concerning land resources from business interests so that both 
land and businesses are treated in a similar fashion.79  In an eagerness 
to protect agribusiness interests against nuisance lawsuits, some right-
to-farm laws granted so much protection that they offended 
 
 71. Sax, supra note 60, at 1442 (observing that “forests regulate the global climate, marshes 
sustain marine fisheries, and prairie grass holds the soil in place”). 
 72. Id. at 429. 
 73. Id.  See also Jerry Ellig, The Economics of Regulatory Takings, 46 S.C. L. REV. 595, 
596-604 (1995) (discussing externalities as the failure to consider the costs or benefits of 
individuals’ actions on other people due to poorly enforced property rights). 
 74. Plater, supra note 60, at 368. 
 75. Plater, supra note 58, at 430. 
 76. See id. (maintaining that externalized costs are often “overlooked in the day-to-day 
economic and political pressures of the marketplace”). 
 77. The emphasis of the marketplace economy on profits overshadows or emasculates the 
consideration of noneconomic values.  For a discussion on the application of nuisance law 
beyond the marketplace economy, see Unger, supra note 64. 
 78. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. See also Bowen v. Flaherty, 601 So. 2d 860, 
861 (Miss. 1992) (noting an investment of $640,000 in a cotton gin before evaluating the 
applicability of a right-to-farm law). 
 79. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 561.19, subdiv. 1(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006) (offering 
protection to facilities and appurtenances at agricultural operations so that the right-to-farm 
laws protect more than land). 
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constitutional parameters.80  Challenges to other right-to-farm laws 
may be expected, as they may go too far in adversely affecting 
neighboring property owners.81 
This failure to distinguish between land resources and business 
interests is important due to the services and resources provided by 
land.82  Land is finite, takes thousands of years to develop,83 and 
provides different externalities than businesses.84  Rural lands often 
have positive externalities in the form of open space, wildlife habitat, 
scenic views, protection against flooding, and areas to absorb 
pollutants.85  The total positive values of these externalities are 
generally not factored into the price of land.86 
More important, the positive externalities of land may be lost 
when structures such as homes or commercial development are built.87  
The ability to use land in the future for agronomic production may 
 
 80. Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 321 (Iowa 1998) (finding a taking); 
Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 185 (Iowa 2004) (finding a violation of the 
inalienable rights clause of the state constitution). 
 81. See supra note 24 (noting challenges to other state right-to-farm laws, although none 
were found to offend constitutional requirements). 
 82. See Robert J. Johnston, James J. Opaluch, Thomas A. Grigalunas & Marisa J. 
Mazzotta, Estimating Amenity Benefits of Coastal Farmland, 32 GROWTH & CHANGE 305, 316-
21 (2001) (identifying three categories of nonmarket values related to farmland: location 
dependent use values, non-location dependent use values, and non-use values). 
 83. AM. FARMLAND TRUST, FARMLAND INFO. CTR., FACT SHEET: WHY SAVE 
FARMLAND? 1 (2003), available at http://www.farmlandinfo.org/documents/28562/Why_Save_ 
Farmland_1-03.pdf (relating American farmland to our economic well-being). 
 84. Land provides open space while businesses involving buildings do not.  See Randall S. 
Rosenberger & John B. Loomis, The Value of Ranch Open Space to Tourists: Combining 
Observed and Contingent Behavior Data, 30 GROWTH & CHANGE 366, 378 (1999) (noting 
studies reporting positive benefits associated with open space and concluding that the land 
allocation market may not be efficient). 
 85. AM. FARMLAND TRUST, supra note 83, at 2-3 (arguing that the country’s farmland is at 
risk because of conversion to development).  See also George Boody, Bruce Vondracek, David 
A. Andow, Mara Krinke, John Westra, Julie Zimmerman & Patrick Welle, Multifunctional 
Agriculture in the United States, 55 BIOSCIENCE 27, 27 (2005) (noting that maintaining 
landscape structure, preserving biodiversity, and contributing to the socio-economic viability of 
rural areas are beneficial externalities of agriculture). 
 86. See Stephen N. Wheeler, The Evolution of Urban Form in Portland and Toronto: 
Implications for Sustainability Planning, 8 LOC. ENV’T 317, 326 (2003) (noting the externalities 
associated with sprawl are significant factors not reflected in land prices). 
 87. See Jason Scott Johnston, The Tragedy of Centralization: The Political Economics of 
American Natural Resource Federalism, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 487, 496 (2003) (advancing a 
centralized system for natural resource preservation in response to the inability of local decision 
makers to internalize beneficial externalities); Shi-Ling Hsu, A Two-Dimensional Framework 
for Analyzing Property Rights Regimes, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 813, 880 (2003) (observing that 
developed parcels impose environmental costs on neighboring undeveloped parcels). 
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also not be incorporated into its marketplace value.88  Another 
concern is that the use of prime farmland for development causes the 
country to rely on inferior lands for agricultural production.89  
Furthermore, the loss of farmland may adversely affect neighboring 
farmers and their ability to continue with their agronomic activities.90 
This suggests that greater attention might be given to assure 
proportionality between ecosystem needs and the institutions 
employed in a market-based economy.91  This does not involve the 
subjugation of property rights to ecology, but rather that ecology 
enters the equation for balancing rights among stakeholders.92  
Through an anti-nuisance paradigm incorporating elements of the 
economy of nature, undeveloped land resources might be offered 
greater protection against market forces that fail to incorporate long-
term economic and societal benefits offered by farmland, forests, and 
natural areas.93 
 
 88. See Richard P. Greene & John Stager, Rangeland to Cropland Conversions as 
Replacement Land for Prime Farmland Lost to Urban Development, 38 SOC. SCI. J. 543, 554 
(2001) (concluding that as farmland is converted to other uses, less-sustainable lands are 
employed for agricultural production); David L. Szlanfucht, Note, How to Save America’s 
Depleting Supply of Farmland, 4 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 333, 337 (1999) (observing that reductions 
in acreages of farmland are felt in local communities). 
 89. See Rutherford H. Platt, The Farmland Conversion Debate: NALS and Beyond, 37 
PROF. GEOGRAPHER 433, 441 (1985). 
 90. See Szlanfucht, supra note 88, at 337 (discussing the loss of farmland and its effects on 
neighboring property). 
 91. See Erik C. Martini, Comment, Wisconsin’s Milldam Act: Drawing New Lessons from 
an Old Law, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 1305, 1325 (discussing efforts to remove dams on rivers in 
Wisconsin and that the allocation of property rights ought to consider ecology). 
 92. Id.; Sax, supra note 60, at 1454. 
 93. The preservation of land was an objective of early right-to-farm legislation.  See supra 
note 4 and accompanying text.  See also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 2-3201 (2001) (enunciating the 
objective of preserving farmland “for the production of food and other agricultural products.”).  
While the preservation of undeveloped land remains the objective for some right-to-farm laws, 
others were revised to add business activities.  The original Georgia right-to farm law adopted in 
1980 covered agricultural and farming operations, places, establishments and facilities.  1980 Ga. 
Laws, p. 1253, §§ 1-2.  Subsequently, the Georgia right-to-farm law was amended to protect: 
(E) The production and keeping of honeybees, the production of honeybee products, 
and honeybee processing facilities; 
(F) The production, processing, or packaging of eggs or egg products; 
(G) The manufacturing of feed for poultry or livestock; 
(H) The rotation of crops, including without limitation timber production; 
(I) Commercial aquaculture 
(J) The application of existing, changed, or new technology, practices, processes, or 
procedures to any agricultural operation; and 
(K) The operation of any roadside market. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 41-1-7(3) (1997 & Supp. 2006). 
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II.  DEVELOPING ANTI-NUISANCE PROTECTION FOR UNDEVELOPED 
LANDS 
Activities occurring on farmlands, forests, and natural areas may 
create conflicts with neighboring property owners.94  Prominent 
objectionable activities for agriculture involve odors from animal 
feeding operations.95  Aerial spraying of herbicides96 and logging 
constitute forestry practices that may irk neighbors.97  Accumulated 
brush,98 invasive species,99 and insect infestations100 on lands that are 
natural areas may cause annoyances that lead to nuisance lawsuits.101  
Many residential property owners feel they should not have to bear 
the inconveniences accompanying agricultural and silvicultural 
production.102  To address these nuisance concerns, an “Undeveloped 
Lands Protection Act” (ULPA) is proposed (see Appendix 2).  
ULPA is modeled after right-to-farm laws but is limited to providing 
protection against nuisance lawsuits involving undeveloped lands.103  
 
 94. See Pasco County v. Tampa Farm Serv., Inc., 573 So. 2d 909, 910 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1990) (involving a conflict concerning odors from liquid poultry manure); Herrin v. Opatut, 281 
S.E.2d 575, 576 (Ga. 1981) (considering odors from a poultry operation); Crea v. Crea, 16 P.3d 
922, 925 (Idaho 2000) (considering the expansion of a hog operation); Payne v. Skaar, 900 P.2d 
1352, 1356 (Idaho 1995) (considering odors from a cattle feedlot); Laux v. Chopin Land Assoc., 
550 N.E.2d 100, 103 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (considering odors from a hog operation); Flansburgh 
v. Coffey, 370 N.W.2d 127, 130-31 (Neb. 1985) (considering the construction of a hog 
confinement building); Holubec v. Brandenberger, 111 S.W.3d 32, 34 (Tex. 2003) (alleging noise 
and flies); Trickett v. Ochs, 838 A.2d 66, 69 (Vt. 2003) (alleging noise, light glare, and traffic). 
 95. See supra note 94. 
 96. See Anderson v. Minnesota, 693 N.W.2d 181, 192 (Minn. 2005) (alleging that the state’s 
use of pesticides on poplar groves created a private nuisance). 
 97. See Alpental Cmty. Club, Inc. v. Seattle Gymnastics Soc’y, 111 P.3d 257, 258 (Wash. 
2005) (alleging that clear-cutting a slope was a nuisance due to the increased potential of an 
avalanche). 
 98. See Jeffrey P. Cohn, Tiff over Tamarisk: Can a Nuisance Be Nice, Too?, 55 BIOSCIENCE 
648, 653 (2005) (noting that accumulations of woody materials from tamarisk trees provided fuel 
for wildfires). 
 99. See id. at 650 (reporting efforts to remove buffelgrass, an invasive weed, because the 
species causes wildfires to burn very hot and spread to additional areas). 
 100. See Fox v. Cheminova, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 2d 160, 175 (E.D. N.Y. 2005) (declining to 
grant defendants summary judgment with respect to a public nuisance claim based on the 
spraying of pesticides to control the West Nile Virus); Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders Ltd. P’Ship, 
952 P.2d 610, 614 (Wash. 1998) (alleging an infestation of flies at an animal feedlot constituted a 
nuisance); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. California, 221 Cal. Rptr. 225, 227 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) 
(alleging a nuisance involving the release of a chemically destructive spray into the atmosphere 
to control an infestation of Mediterranean fruit flies). 
 101. See infra notes 132-133 and accompanying text. 
 102. See generally supra note 94. 
 103. See generally ULPA, tits. I-VII, infra app. 2.  Undeveloped lands refer to real property 
consisting of acreages of land and/or water used as farmlands, forests, and natural areas.  
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The distinction involves the exclusion of business activities that are 
not necessary for the stewardship of land or its productive capacity.104 
While ULPA differentiates activities relating to the use of land 
from business activities, it is not intended to downplay the importance 
of business activities to economically beneficial land-use.105 Other 
mechanisms, however, are already available to support such business 
activities, including existing right-to-farm laws, tax incentives, 
conservation easements, purchasing development rights, and 
transferring development rights.106  ULPA supplements these other 
mechanisms to offer an enhanced nuisance defense to undeveloped 
lands.  By excluding business activities, the statutory defense applies 
in fewer situations and thus can go further in using a state’s police 
power to re-balance the equities among neighbors with conflicting 
land uses.107  Under ULPA, the economy of nature supports 
additional protection solely for undeveloped lands.108 
 
Practices to improve the productive capacity of lands, structures for educational purposes, and 
efforts to preserve archaeological and cultural resources are permitted.  See tit. III(G), infra 
app. 2. 
 104. The division of business activities from lands mirrors the division of economic 
incentives from land preservation.  Rather than focusing on the economic viability of business 
activities, ULPA seeks to stop nuisance lawsuits that interfere with the use of undeveloped land.  
See tit. II, infra app. 2.  See also Alterman, supra note 30, at 222, 238 (contrasting European land 
preservation to the use of economic incentives to preserve farmland in the United States). 
 105. Business activities are important to land but are more appropriately governed by 
existing nuisance provisions, including right-to-farm laws. 
 106. See Mark W. Cordes, Agricultural Zoning: Impacts and Future Directions, 22 N. ILL. U. 
L. REV. 419, 422-57 (2002) (discussing agricultural zoning as a major player among programs to 
save farmland); Mark W. Cordes, Fairness and Farmland Preservation: A Response to Professor 
Richardson, 20 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 371, 393-98 (2005) (discussing the preservation of 
farmlands within the context of interfering with private property rights); Theodore A. Feitshans, 
PDRs and TDRs: Land Preservation Tools in a Universe of Voluntary and Compulsory Land 
Use Planning Tools, 7 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 305, 329 (2002) (discussing transfer of development 
rights as a means to preserve farmland); Elisa Paster, Preservation of Agricultural Lands 
Through Land Use Planning Tools and Techniques, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 283, 283-308 (2004) 
(discussing regulatory options that might be used to preserve farmland); Jesse J. Richardson, Jr., 
Downzoning Fairness and Farmland Protection, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 59, 75-90 (2003) 
(discussing who should pay for diminished values of lands preserved as farmlands); Jeanne S. 
White, Beating Plowshares into Townhomes: The Loss of Farmland and Strategies for Slowing 
Its Conversion to Nonagricultural Uses, 28 ENVTL. L. 113, 143 (1998) (opining a need to balance 
farmland preservation with urban growth).  See also Szlanfucht, supra note 88, at 343-52 
(discussing methods to save farmland). 
 107. See Hamilton, supra note 2, at 113 (observing that right-to-farm laws were passed when 
agricultural production was quite different and that the laws might not be appropriate for the 
size of modern operations); Walker, supra note 15, at 461 (noting differences in the size of 
agricultural operations and suggesting that these structural changes alter the justifications for 
right-to-farm laws). 
 108. See supra notes 67-93 and accompanying text (delineating the economy of nature). 
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ULPA consists of seven sections: the legislative purpose, 
protection, definitions, exceptions, retained rights, preemption of 
local ordinances, and litigation expenses.109  The provisions are 
adapted from right-to-farm laws and directed toward nuisances that 
occur on undeveloped lands.110  ULPA is not intended to replace 
right-to-farm laws; rather, it provides a supplemental defense for 
qualifying property owners against nuisance actions.111 
A. Legislative Purpose 
To delineate what is intended and to define legitimate 
governmental objectives, ULPA sets forth a legislative purpose.112  
Several issues are incorporated into the statement describing the act’s 
objectives.  The first legislative directive delineates a policy of 
encouraging the use and improvement of the state’s farmlands, 
forests, and natural areas while simultaneously conserving and 
protecting these resources.113  As described in title I(A), these lands 
offer important services and are irreplaceable resources of statewide 
importance.114  Given the nature of the natural resources being 
protected, the act contributes to the general benefit of people’s health 
and welfare.115 
A second aspect of ULPA’s purpose is to enhance the use of 
undeveloped lands for outdoor recreational activities, scenic vistas, 
and ecological and natural resources.116  Title I(B) observes that open 
 
 109. See ULPA, tits. I-VII, infra app. 2 (text of the proposed act). 
 110. The intent is to protect land resources: lands that have not been developed or have 
been developed with a minimum of permanent structures that interfere with agricultural, 
recreational, or open space land uses.  See tit. I, infra app. 2. 
 111. The act would be of special assistance in states where a right-to-farm law was found to 
offend constitutional provisions.  See See Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 321 
(Iowa 1998); Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 175-77 (Iowa 2004) (finding right-to-
farm laws unconstitutional). 
 112. Tit. I, infra app. 2 (incorporating ideas from several right-to-farm laws, including the 
Pennsylvania law, 3 PA. STAT. ANN. § 951 (West 1995 & Supp. 2006) (stating that the law’s 
purpose is to conserve and encourage the protection of agriculture land)). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Tit. I(A), infra app. 2 (mirroring the legislative purpose of Kansas’ right to farm law).  
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 2-3201 (2001) (encouraging agricultural production). 
 115. Id. (adopting a statement that the preservation of agriculture will serve citizens’ best 
interests from right-to-farm laws in Florida and New Jersey).  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
823.14 (West 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:1C-2 (West 1998). 
 116. Tit. I(B), infra app. 2 (listing purposes delineated by the Vermont right-to-farm law).  
See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5751 (2002 & Supp. 2006) (stating that agicultural activities 
preserve the state’s resources and landscape while contributing to tourism and the general 
health and welfare of the people). 
01__CENTNER.DOC 2/6/2007  4:55 PM 
18 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 17:1 
fields, pastures, forests, and natural areas are important to tourism 
and the quality of life of people in the state.117  Forest lands may be 
important to an area’s economic and ecological health.118  
Undeveloped lands may cleanse common water and air resources.119  
This is why efforts should be made to limit urban encroachment, the 
development and construction of structures, and the paving of areas 
with impervious surfaces.120  Simultaneously, the legislative purpose 
acknowledges the lack of adequate and informed consideration of 
natural resources, their relationship to the state’s economy, and the 
need to sustain activities on undeveloped lands.121 
Title I(C) of ULPA sets forth a legislative purpose concerning 
urban encroachment and the development of physical structures.122  
These activities result in fragmentation that diminishes the long-term 
ability of the land and appurtenant parcels to be maintained in 
natural productive uses, which may lead to the loss of resources.123  
Fragmentation and the development of structures also interfere with 
the long-term use of undeveloped lands because, as farm and forest 
 
 117. See id. 
 118. Donna L. Erickson, Robert L. Ryan & Raymond De Young, Woodlots in the Rural 
Landscape: Landowner Motivations and Management Attitudes in a Michigan (USA) Case 
Study, 58 LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. 101, 101 (2002) (finding that aesthetics and environmental 
protection were more significant than economics for maintaining woodlots). 
 119. See Michael D. Jawson, Evert Byington, Dale Bucks, Mark Weltz & Robert Wright, 
East, or West–Suiting Farms to Their Environments, 53 AGRIC. RES., Aug. 2005 at 2, 2 (noting 
that agriculture can provide ecological services); Keith L. Olenickm, Urs P. Kreuter & J. 
Richard Conner, Texas Landowner Perceptions Regarding Ecosystem Services and Cost-sharing 
Land Management Programs, 53 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 247, 247-48 (noting ecological services 
performed by rangelands). 
 120. This is not to say that limits on areas of impervious surfaces are universally considered 
a good idea.  See Jonathan E. Jones, T. Andrew Searles, Elizabeth A. Fassman, Edwin E. 
Herricks, Ben Urbonas & Jane K. Clary, Urban Storm-Water Regulations–Are Impervious Area 
Limits a Good Idea?, 131 J. ENVTL. ENGINEERING 176, 178 (2005) (chastising limits on 
impervious surfaces because they often create “more significant environmental problems”). 
 121. Tit. I(B)(3), infra app. 2 (adopting ideas from a Florida law delineating a policy for 
agricultural production).  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 604.001(6) (West 2003) (stating that the 
lack of informed consideration has caused problems for agricultural production). 
 122. Tit. I(C), infra app. 2. 
 123. Tit. I(C)(1), infra app. 2.  See also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 22-4501 (2001) (stating “that 
agricultural activities conducted on farmland in urbanizing areas are often subjected to nuisance 
lawsuits, and that such suits encourage and even force the premature removal of the lands from 
agricultural uses, and in some cases prohibit investments in agricultural improvements.”); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 2-23-2(4) (1998) (postulating “[t]hat conflicts between agricultural and urban land 
uses threaten to force the abandonment of agricultural operations and the conversion of 
agricultural resources to non-agricultural land uses, whereby these resources are permanently 
lost to the economy and the human and physical environments of the state.”). 
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lands are developed, fragmentation begets fragmentation.124  When 
owners of undeveloped land sell parcels for development, remaining 
lands become scattered and are more likely to experience annoyances 
and interferences.125  Urbanization results in the loss of more land 
than is incorporated in urban land uses and often diminishes the 
quality of nearby water resources.126 
Urban development next to farmlands, forests, and natural areas 
tends to create conflicts that threaten the demise of these resources.127  
Title I(C)(2) notes that the urbanization of an area may lead to the 
demise of important natural resources.128  Certain activities necessary 
to the use of agricultural and forestry lands are not always pleasant.129  
Pesticides and herbicides may be used and neighbors may fear that 
the poisons will adversely affect their health.130  Fertilization with 
animal manure may result in offensive odors.131  Natural areas may 
accumulate plant undergrowth that creates a fire hazard to 
neighboring homes and structures,132 and controlled burns may be 
 
 124. Rutherford V. Platt, Global and Local Analysis of Fragmentation in a Mountain Region 
of Colorado, 101 AGRIC., ECOSYSTEMS & ENV’T 207, 217 (2004) (analyzing changes in 
fragmentation of urban development between 1985 and 1999). 
 125. Elizabeth Brabec & Chip Smith, Agricultural Land Fragmentation: The Spatial Effects 
of Three Land Protection Strategies in the Eastern United States, 58 LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. 
101, 101 (2002) (discussing issues accompanying agricultural land fragmentation). 
 126. Bryan C. Pijanowski, Bradley Shellito, Snehal Pithadia & Konstantinos Alexandridis, 
Forecasting and Assessing the Impact of Urban Sprawl in Coastal Watersheds Along Eastern 
Lake Michigan, 7 LAKES & RESERVOIRS: RES. & MGMT. 271, 282 (2002) (employing a model to 
analyze urban-use changes in Michigan and analyzing data to show the impairment of 
watersheds and loss of riparian habitats as areas urbanize). 
 127. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 2-23-2(3)-(4) (1998) (citing conflicts between traditional 
agricultural land uses and urban land uses as justification for the Rhode Island right-to-farm 
law); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.48.300 (West 1992 & Supp. 2005) (observing that nuisance 
lawsuits in urbanizing areas may lead to the “premature removal of the lands from agricultural 
uses and timber production.”).  Alternatively, the availability of off-farm employment may lead 
farmers to opt for non-farm occupations and the reversion of farmland to forest land.  Kristi 
MacDonald & Thomas K. Rudel, Sprawl and Forest Cover: What is the Relationship?, 25 
APPLIED GEOGRAPHY 67, 75 (2005) (discussing urban sprawl and the loss of forest cover). 
 128. Infra app. 2. 
 129. See generally supra note 94 (identifying various nuisance cases involving objectionable 
activities). 
 130. Macias v. California, 897 P.2d 530, 531 (Cal. 1995) (alleging damages from helicopter 
spraying of the insecticide malathion); Adkins v. California, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59, 61 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1996) (alleging damages from hanging traps in a pest eradication program). 
 131. Pasco County v. Tampa Farm Serv., Inc., 573 So.2d 909, 912 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) 
(noting that the Florida right-to-farm law was to protect established farmers from “sprawling 
urban development”). 
 132. See Cohn, supra note 98, at 653 (discussing an exotic species of tree that provides fuel 
for wildfires that kills native vegetation). 
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advocated to burn undergrowth creating a nuisance to neighboring 
lands.133  The anti-nuisance protection seeks to safeguard the long-
term ability of lands and appurtenant parcels to be maintained in 
natural productive uses.134 
Finally, ULPA’s purpose notes in title I(D) that the overriding 
purpose of the act is to limit the circumstances under which 
farmlands, forests, and natural areas may be deemed a nuisance.135  
Neighbors resort to nuisance lawsuits to stop the annoying activities.  
If the activities are enjoined, the inability to employ a practice may 
force the premature demise of the current productive capacities.136  
ULPA intends to limit interferences with the inherent agronomic 
qualities and ecological values of the state’s undeveloped lands.137 
B. The Protection 
Title II delineates the protection offered by the ULPA.138  
Activities needed for the viable use of farmlands, forests, and natural 
areas are permitted to continue.139  Conditions commonly associated 
with these parcels need to be accepted by people who locate nearby 
despite their objectionableness.140  This protection is important to 
owners of undeveloped lands because it discourages incompatible 
 
 133. See J. Morgan Varner, III, Doria R. Gordon, Francis E. Putz & J. Kevin Hiers, 
Restoring Fire to Long-Unburned Pinus palustris Ecosystems: Novel Fire Effects and 
Consequences for Long-Unburned Ecosystems, 13 RESTORATION ECOLOGY 536, 541 (2005) 
(advocating restoring and maintaining southeastern pine ecosystems); Sharon Levy, Rekindling 
Native Fires, 55 BIOSCIENCE 303, 304 (2005) (noting the value of controlled burns in restoring 
native habitats). 
 134. Tit. I(C), infra app. 2.   See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 22-4501 (2001) (citing “the premature 
removal of the lands from agricultural uses”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 2-23-2(4) (1998) (expressing 
concern about “the conversion of agricultural resources to non-agricultural land uses” and the 
permanent loss of resources). 
 135. Tit. I(D), infra app. 2 (adopting a legislative purpose from similar provisions in 
numerous right-to-farm laws including HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 165-1 (LexisNexis 2000), 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 22-4501 (2001), 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/1 (West 2002), N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 47-9-2 (LexisNexis 1999), and S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-45-10(3) (1987 & Supp. 2005)). 
 136. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-45-10(2) (1987 & Supp. 2005) (noting the problem of 
agricultural facilities being forced to cease production). 
 137. Tit. I(D), infra app. 2.  See Lichtman v. Nadler,  426 N.Y.S.2d 628, 631 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1980) (rejecting a claim that stagnant water was a nuisance due to mosquitoes and unpleasant 
odors). 
 138. Tit. II, infra app. 2. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. tit. II(A).  See also OR. REV. STAT. § 30.933(2)(c) (2005) (declaring that “[p]ersons 
who locate on or near an area zoned for farm or forest use must accept the conditions 
commonly associated with living in that particular setting.”). 
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land uses from moving into the area.141  After a short policy 
declaration, ULPA sets forth three different provisions for protection 
of land resources: (1) a statute of limitations, (2) a rebuttable 
presumption that activities are not a nuisance and (3) an affirmative 
defense to nuisance actions involving coming to the nuisance.142 
First, title II(A) specifies a state policy that activities are to 
continue on lands covered by the act.143  By referring to the conditions 
at the particular setting, ULPA tells people that they should expect 
activities that are consistent with the setting.144  People living next to 
crop lands should expect annoyances from land cultivation and 
harvesting activities.145  Timber harvesting in forests will involve 
logging activities accompanied by negative externalities that 
adversely affect neighbors.146  People with farmland, forestry areas, 
and natural areas should be able to allow natural vegetation including 
weeds to grow.147  Under ULPA, plaintiffs are stopped from 
 
 141. The significance of limiting non-agricultural land uses is that there will be fewer 
pressures to develop or sell land.  See Brett Zollinger & Richard S. Krannich, Factors 
Influencing Farmers’ Expectations to Sell Agricultural Land for Non-Agricultural Uses, 67 
RURAL SOC. 442, 459 (2002) (noting that changes in land use may encourage a farmer to sell 
land for non-agricultural purposes). 
 142. Tit. II(B)-(D), infra app. 2.  See also VT. STAT. ANN. tit.12, § 5753 (2002 & Supp. 2006) 
(establishing a rebutable presumption that a prescribed activity is not a nuisance); 3 PA. STAT. 
ANN. § 954 (West 1995 & Supp. 2006) (establishing a one year statute of limitation for initiating 
a nuisance action). 
 143. Tit. II(A), infra app. 2.  See also OR. REV. STAT. § 30.933 (2005) (delineating the 
protection of lands). 
 144. Tit. II(A), infra app. 2 (referencing particular settings [farmlands, forests, and natural 
areas] to recognize that activities on farmlands may be different from those occurring on forests 
and that the conditions only pertain to the individual setting). 
 145. See Marti Maguire, Caution: Farm Zone; Agricultural Districts Could Protect Farmers 
from Newcomers Who Raise a Stink, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 10, 2005, at B1 
(noting tractors kick up dust and create nuisances); Jane Hawes, Rural Relations: Talking 
Across the Fence Helps Farmers, Newcomers Get Along, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), July 20, 
2003, at 01B (noting a neighbor’s objections to the dust and dirt from a nearby cattle and hog 
operation). 
 146. See P. Bérubé & F. Lévesque, Effects of Forestry Clear-cutting on Numbers and Sizes of 
Brook Trout, Salvelinus fontinalis (Mitchill), in Lakes of the Mastigouche Wildlife Reserve, 
Québec, Canada, 5 FISHERIES MGMT. & ECOLOGY 123, 133 (1998) (noting that logging may 
cause the siltation of streams and decreased fishing stocks); Ansgar Kahmen & Erik S. Jules, 
Assessing the Recovery of a Long-lived Herb Following Logging: Trillium ovatum Across a 424-
year Chronosequence, 210 FOREST ECOLOGY & MGMT. 107, 113-15 (2005) (observing that long 
term biological diversity depends on logging practices). 
 147. But see Goodenow v. City of Maquoketa, 574 N.W.2d 18, 20 (Iowa 1998) (finding that 
the city could enforce an ordinance requiring a landowner to mow grass and weeds in a city 
right-of-way). 
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maintaining nuisance lawsuits about activities or conditions that 
ordinarily transpire on undeveloped lands.148 
A case from Florida shows the need for this protection.149  In 
Kupke v. Orange County, a county enforcement officer cited a farmer 
for “operating an unauthorized ‘junkyard’ on his agricultural zoned 
land because he ‘stored’ a bushhog, a bulldozer, a crane, a backhoe, 
and various other equipment and materials outdoors. . . .”150  The 
issue was whether the equipment said to constitute a nuisance was 
protected by the anti-nuisance provisions of the Florida right-to-farm 
law.151  For the county’s case, witnesses claimed the machinery created 
a nuisance without addressing the question of whether the equipment 
was used for farming purposes.152  Moreover, at the hearing on the 
citation, the defendant was not allowed to present testimony from 
farmers about the nature of the equipment.153  In considering a writ of 
certiorari, the appellate court quashed the lower decisions.154  The 
matter was remanded to provide the defendant an opportunity to 
show that “the challenged equipment has an agricultural use which 
meets the policy expressed by the legislature” for maintaining the 
production of agricultural commodities for food and fiber.155  ULPA’s 
 
 148. Tit. II(A), infra app 2.  Like the right-to-farm laws, ULPA would be an affirmative 
defense and some nuisance causes of action would continue to be viable.  See id. tits. IV-V 
(delineating exceptions to the defense). 
 149. Kupke v. Orange County, 838 So. 2d 598, 590 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). 
 150. Id. at 598-99. 
 151. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 823.14(4) (West 2006)). 
 152. Kupke, 838 So. 2d at 599 (complaining about “contamination, fires, snakes and rats”). 
 153. Id. (thwarting efforts of the defendant to show that the equipment was being used for 
farming purposes). 
 154. Id. at 599-600 (remanding the issue to the circuit court and the county code 
enforcement board). 
 155. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 604.001 (West 2003)).  In addressing agricultural 
production in Florida, the Legislature has declared that: 
(1) It is the public policy of this state and the purpose of this act to achieve and 
maintain the production of agricultural commodities for food and fiber as an essential 
element for the survival of mankind. 
. . . . 
 . . .(3) A sound agricultural industry in this state requires the efficient and profitable 
use of water and energy and many other natural, commercial, and industrial resources. 
. . . . 
. . .(5) It is important to the health and welfare of the people of this state and to the 
economy of the state that additional problems are not created for growers and 
ranchers engaged in the Florida agricultural industry by laws and regulations that 
cause, or tend to cause, agricultural production to become inefficient or 
unprofitable. . . . 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 604.001 (West 2003).  Some of the provisions of this Florida law have been 
incorporated in the legislative purpose of ULPA.  See tit. I(B), infra app. 2. 
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title II delineates anti-nuisance protection to sanction activities 
associated with agricultural and forestry production.156 
Simultaneously, ULPA contains an important qualification: the 
activities must be conducted according to “generally accepted 
practices.”157  This qualification sets a benchmark whereby unjustified 
practices, and practices that deviate from the norm, are excluded 
from coverage by the act.158  Further qualifications concerning 
generally accepted activities are set forth in the definition of this 
term.159 
To provide more protection than is offered by most right-to-farm 
laws, ULPA’s title II(B) establishes a two-year statute of limitation 
for nuisance actions on qualifying undeveloped lands.160  Four states 
(Minnesota, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, and Texas) have adopted time 
periods to serve as a period of limitation and defeat nuisance 
actions.161  The two-year period, adapted from the Minnesota Right to 
Farm Act,162 provides a limited time frame during which nuisance 
claims can be brought against an operation protected by the statute.163  
After the two-year window closes, a neighboring landowner is 
precluded from bringing a nuisance action.164 
 
 156. Tit. II, infra app. 2. 
 157. Id. tit. II(A). See also Walker, supra note 15, at 480-85 (discussing the “generally 
accepted agricultural and management practices” as delineated by the Michigan right-to-farm 
law). 
 158. See tit. II(A), infra app. 2.  See Souza v. Lauppe, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494, 500 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1997) (observing that activities conducted consistent with proper and accepted customs 
were not a nuisance).  See also HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 165-4 (LexisNexis 2000 & Supp. 2005) 
(requiring “generally accepted agricultural and management practices” for qualification under 
the right-to-farm law); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 561.19, subdiv. 2(a)(3) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006) 
(requiring “generally accepted practices” to qualify for the exception to nuisance law). 
 159. See tit. III(D), infra app. 2. 
 160. Id. tit. II(B). 
 161. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 561.19, subdiv. 2(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006), interpreted in 
Overgaard v. Rock County Bd. of Comm’rs, No. 02-601, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13001, *20-22 
(D. Minn. July 25, 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 95-3-29(a) (2004), interpreted in Bowen v. 
Flaherty, 601 So. 2d 860, 862-63 (Miss. 1992); 3 PA. STAT. ANN. § 954(a) (West 1995 & Supp. 
2006), interpreted in Horne v. Haladay, 728 A.2d 954, 956-58 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999); TEX. AGRIC. 
CODE ANN. § 251.004 (Vernon 2004 & Supp. 2006), interpreted in Barrera v. Hondo Creek 
Cattle Co., 132 S.W.3d 544, 548-49 (Tex. App. 2004). 
 162. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 561.19, subdiv. 2(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006). 
 163. See tit II(B), infra app. 2. 
 164. See Overgaard v. Rock County Bd. of Comm’rs, No. 02-601, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
13001, at *20-22 (D. Minn. July 25, 2003) (interpreting the Minnesota right-to-farm law’s statute 
of limitations). 
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Third, ULPA’s title II(C) offers a rebuttable presumption that 
activities are not a nuisance on lands covered by the act.165  This 
presumption applies to all activities on these lands regardless of 
whether the activities predated neighboring land uses.166  In this 
manner, ULPA supports and protects activities even though they 
slightly interfere with neighboring properties.167  However, limitations 
are provided in other provisions of the act.  An activity needs to be 
conducted according to generally accepted practices in order to 
qualify for the protection of the act,168 and certain enumerated 
activities do not qualify for the presumption.169  If a new activity is 
unreasonable, the presumption can be overcome and nuisance law 
would provide a resolution for the conflict.170 
Fourth, for individuals moving near existing parcels, ULPA’s 
title II(D) sets forth a “coming to the nuisance” doctrine.171  If an 
activity was not a nuisance when commenced, and has continued for 
one year prior to people moving next to the activity, the anti-nuisance 
defense is available.172  This provision is important for protecting 
investments in capital and labor used for farming and forestry 
business pursuits.173  The exception must also be read in conjunction 
 
 165. Tit. II(C), infra app. 2 (adopting a rebuttable presumption from the Vermont right-to-
farm statute, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5753(a) (2002 & Supp. 2006)). 
 166. Id. Simultaneously, the activities that were there first are further protected by the 
coming to the nuisance doctrine delineated in part D of title II.  Id. tit. II(D). 
 167. See generally id. tit. II.  The presumption in ULPA’s title II(C) indicates that activities 
should be excepted from nuisance even if they have not existed, but this may be overcome by 
evidence to the contrary.  Since nuisance involves a balancing of equities, the act would 
recognize a legislatively espoused priority of safeguarding undeveloped lands.  See id. tit. II. 
 168. Id. tit. II(A).  See also id. tit. III(D) (defining “generally accepted practices”). 
 169. See id. tits. IV, V(A). 
 170. Id. tit. II(C).  This is because not only does the presumption not apply, but the 
affirmative defense is also not applicable because the coming to the nuisance provision does not 
protect new activities.  Id. tit. II(D).  See also Trickett v. Ochs, 838 A.2d 66, 72-74 (Vt. 2003) 
(finding that the rebuttable presumption did not preclude a nuisance action where there was not 
urban encroachment). 
 171. Tit. II(D), infra app. 2.  This doctrine has been adopted by many right-to-farm laws.  
See Hand, supra note 1, at 307 (noting priority in usage is consistent with the coming to the 
nuisance defense). 
 172. Tit. II(D), infra app. 2 (adopting a one-year time frame to define the coming to the 
nuisance exception from several right-to-farm laws).  See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 41-1-7(c) (1997 
& Supp. 2006); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/3 (West 2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-30-6-9(d) 
(West 1999 & Supp. 2006). 
 173. Cf.  supra note 123.  The coming to the nuisance defense will be important for activities 
that started before changes in nearby land uses.  In Vicwood Meridian Partnership’ship v. Skagit 
Sand & Gravel, a farm in existence since the 1920s was composting poultry litter for the 
production of mushrooms.  98 P.3d 1277, 1279 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).  The defendant altered its 
01__CENTNER.DOC 2/6/2007  4:55 PM 
Fall 2006] UNDEVELOPED LAND PROTECTION 25 
with title IV of the act which requires conformity with all laws, no 
maliciousness, and excludes activities that would be injurious to 
public health or safety.174 
C. Definitions 
ULPA sets forth seven definitions to enunciate the meanings of 
key terms.175  Through the definition of activities, farmlands, forests, 
generally accepted practices, manure, natural areas, and undeveloped 
lands, parameters are given for the protection accorded by the act.176 
1. Activities 
Activities are defined in two separate paragraphs: one for food 
and crop production areas and the second for natural areas.177  
Activities include conditions and pursuits associated with the 
production of agricultural, aquacultural, and silvicultural products 
and the management of the production areas for continued 
agronomic objectives.178  To further delineate what types of activities 
this might include, ULPA lists fertilizer application, weed and pest 
control, planting, cultivating, reforesting, on-site composting,179 
drainage,180 mowing, harvesting, land clearing, insect and disease 
control, constructing ponds associated with farming or aquacultural 
operations, thinning, fire protection, and fence maintenance.181  This 
 
composting process and was sued by neighbors who had moved to the nuisance.  Id.  The court 
found that the coming to the nuisance defense incorporated in the right-to-farm law protected 
the defendant against the nuisance lawsuit.  Id. at 1280-82 (interpreting WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. §§ 7.48.300–.310 (West 1992 & Supp. 2005)).  Similarly, ULPA incorporates the coming to 
the nuisance doctrine in title II(D) to offer the protection to existing activities.  Infra app. 2. 
 174. Tit. IV, infra app. 2.  See also infra Part II.D (discussing the exceptions of ULPA’s 
nuisance protection). 
 175. Tit. III, infra app. 2. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. tit. III(A)(1)-(2). 
 178. Id. tit. III(A)(1) (listing activities from the Washington state right-to-farm law, WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 7.48.310(1) (West 1992 & Supp. 2005)). 
 179. However, bringing materials to the site for composting would be a business activity not 
intended to be protected by the act.  Tit. III(A)(1), infra app. 2.  See also Johnson v. Compost 
Prods., Inc., 731 N.E.2d 948, 950 (Ill. Ap. Ct. 2000) (considering an allegation that a mushroom 
composting business constituted a nuisance). 
 180. Flooding would constitute a nuisance under ULPA, tit. V(A)(2), infra app. 2. Cf. Ditch 
v. Hess, 292 N.W.2d 397, 398 (Iowa 1980) (observing that an interference with drainage causing 
farmland to be unusable could constitute a continuing nuisance). 
 181. Tit. III(A)(1), infra app. 2 (listing activities from the Kentucky right-to-farm law, KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.072(3) (West 2005), and permitted activities from Washington state 
funding for recreation and wildlife, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 79A.20.010(1) (West 2001)). 
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list is not intended to be exhaustive of the activities that will be 
covered.182  Furthermore, the text notes that an activity may be 
accompanied by odors, noise, air particulates, use of chemicals, and 
the lawful impairment of waters.183 
Due to the fact that natural areas may have quite different 
activities from those occurring on lands specifically geared for the 
production of crops, ULPA’s title III(A)(2) contains a separate 
paragraph protecting conditions and pursuits associated with natural 
areas.184  Reference is made to activities involving the protection, 
management, and development of scenic, outdoor recreational, 
cultural, archaeological, and ecological resources.185  ULPA is 
intended to offer anti-nuisance protection for undeveloped lands 
providing these resources. 
2. Farmlands 
“Farmlands” are defined to include parcels greater than ten acres 
that are devoted primarily for the production of crops, livestock, 
freshwater aquacultural, horticultural, or other agricultural 
commodities.186  Areas of land, swampland, ponds, and small lakes 
may be included in the calculation of the requisite acreage size.187  A 
parcel of less than ten acres suggests that the area is of an insufficient 
size to constitute a meaningful, undeveloped land resource.188 
To give further direction to the definition of farmlands, a listing 
of land uses is included, enumerating field crops, vineyards, orchards, 
groves, vegetable and fruit crops, pastures, areas without roofed 
structures for holding farm animals, water bodies for the production 
of aquacultural products, ponds, small lakes, and forestry areas as 
 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. (adopting the list of activities from the Connecticut right-to-farm law, CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 19a-341(a) (West 2003 & Supp. 2006), and the Rhode Island right-to-farm law, 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 2-23-5(a) (1998)). 
 184. Id. tit. III(A)(2).  For example, natural water areas with excess nutrients and sediments 
may allegedly create a nuisance.  Steilacoom Lake Improvement Club v. Washington, No. 
31676-5-II, 2005 Wash. App. LEXIS 1936, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App.  2005) (alleging that the 
aquatic plant growth in a lake constituted a nuisance). 
 185. Tit. III(A)(2), infra app. 2 (adopting activities for preservation of natural areas from a 
Washington statute, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 79.70.010 (West 2001)). 
 186. Id. tit. III(B) (adopting the ten-acre idea from the Nebraska right-to-farm law, NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 2-4402(1) (2001)). 
 187. Id. (adopting the idea of including waters used for aquacultural production from the 
Mississippi right-to-farm law, MISS. CODE ANN. § 95-3-29(2)(a) (2004)). 
 188. Areas less than ten acres may be associated with urbanization and thus do not have 
sufficient qualities to be considered as undeveloped lands.  See supra note 186. 
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acceptable land uses.189  The definition of farmlands also includes 
appurtenant natural areas, which would include parcels that are not 
readily incorporated into cultivated acreages.190 
3. Forests 
ULPA’s title III(C) defines forests to mean parcels greater than 
ten acres that are used in the production of timber and related fiber 
crops.191  Forestry production activities include timber harvest, site 
preparation, slash disposal including controlled burning, tree planting, 
pre-commercial thinning, fertilization, animal damage control, 
reasonable water resource management, insect and disease control in 
forest land, and any other generally accepted, reasonable, and 
prudent practice normally employed in the management of the timber 
resource for monetary profit.192  Through the definition of forests, 
recognized forestry activities receive protection from nuisance 
lawsuits.193 
4. Generally Accepted Practices 
One of the difficulties in exempting practices from nuisance 
lawsuits is defining what practices are exempted.  While malicious 
and injurious practices are excepted,194 there remain other practices 
that are not reasonable and should not be protected from nuisance 
lawsuits.  A definition of “generally accepted practices” is provided in 
ULPA to provide guidance in discerning the coverage of the act.195  
Generally accepted practices mean reasonable and prudent methods 
for the activities being conducted and apply to activities used in a 
county or contiguous county in which a nuisance claim is asserted.196  
 
 189. Tit. III(B), infra app. 2.  This supports the objective of protecting undeveloped lands. 
 190. Id.  Farms may have small parcels of less than ten acres that are woodlands, corners 
between fields, or buffers that can be considered to be part of the farmlands that merit anti-
nuisance protection. 
 191. Id. tit. III(C) (adopting the ten-acre minimum as used for farmlands).  The overlap of 
this definition with farmlands is intentional; all agricultural and silvicultural crops are intended 
to be within the protection afforded by the act. 
 192. Id. (adopting activities permitted under the Kentucky right-to-farm law, KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 413.072(3) (West 2005)). 
 193. Id.  However, a few activities are not protected.  See id. tit. IV(B)(4) (prohibitng the 
clear-cutting of forests). 
 194. Id. tit. IV(A)(1). 
 195. Id. tit. III(D) (adopting language for qualification from the Kentucky right-to-farm law, 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.072(3) (West 2005)). 
 196. Id. (incorporating the idea of having generally accepted practices relate to counties 
from the Minnesota right-to-farm law, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 561.19, subdiv. 1(c) (West 2000 & 
Supp. 2006)). 
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This limitation precludes practices from a divergent region of a state 
from qualifying as generally accepted practices. 
Generally accepted practices include those practices necessary 
for the on-site production and preparation of agricultural or forestry 
commodities, such as the operation of equipment, proper use of 
pesticides, air and water quality control, noise control, fertilizer 
application, labor practices, and crop protection methods.197  As 
further clarifications, two presumptions are delineated.  Practices that 
are commonly or reasonably associated with agricultural production 
are assumed to qualify as generally accepted practices.198  Activities in 
conformity with federal, state, and local laws and regulations are 
presumed to be conducted according to generally accepted 
practices.199 
5. Manure 
One of the controversial activities involving agricultural 
production and nuisance law is manure application to fields.200  The 
application of manure can be a nuisance, especially if the application 
occurs at an inappropriate time or fails to conform with acceptable 
practices.201 Simultaneously, the application of manure to fields is a 
desired agronomic practice, as manure contributes to the fertility of 
the soil by adding organic matter and nutrients.202  ULPA’s title III(E) 
sets forth a definition for manure providing guidance for future 
provisions of the act that distinguishes permitted manure application 
to fields from other practices that remain subject to nuisance 
lawsuits.203  “Manure” is defined to include organic matter from farm 
 
 197. Id. tit. III(D)(1) (incorporating ideas on practices from N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:1C-9 (West 
1998 & Supp. 2006) and N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 308(1)(b) (McKinney 2004)). 
 198. Id. tit. III(D)(2) (adopting the presumption from the Colorado right-to-farm law, 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-3.5-102(1)(a) (West 1998 & Supp. 2006)). 
 199. Id. (adopting the qualification from the right-to-farm laws from a number of states 
including ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-112(B) (2005), KAN. STAT. ANN. § 2-3202 (2001), and 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-38-7(2) (2002)). 
 200. See supra note 94 (citing cases concerning odors). 
 201. Tits. IV(B)(3), V(B)(1), infra app. 2 (excepting animal waste lagoons and spray fields 
from the protection offered by ULPA but protecting the application of manure to fields). 
 202. A.A. Araji ET AL., Efficient Use of Animal Manure on Cropland: Economic Analysis, 
79 BIORESOURCE TECH. 179, 179-180 (2001) (noting that the use of animal manure for crop 
production should be encouraged as it supplies nutrients and organic matter to the soil, 
augments the soil’s water-holding capacity, and increases the soil’s fertility). See also Terence J. 
Centner, EMPTY PASTURES: CONFINED ANIMALS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE RURAL 
LANDSCAPE 63 (2004) (noting that the application of manure to land for crop growth is a 
recommended practice). 
 203. Tit. III(E), infra app. 2.  See also id. tits. IV(B)(2)-(3), V(B). 
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animals used as fertilizer in agriculture.204  Poultry litter is also defined 
as involving excreted manure from avian species mixed with bedding 
material.205  For the purposes of the act, manure includes poultry 
litter.206 
6. Natural Areas 
“Natural areas” are defined as parcels greater than ten acres 
which have retained their natural, undeveloped character.207  These 
areas would exclude cultivated fields and forests, but would include 
forestry areas that consist of natural regeneration of trees.208  
Moreover, natural areas do not have to be completely undisturbed as 
they might include lands that are important in preserving 
archaeological or cultural resources, ecosystems, flora, fauna, 
geological, open space, natural historical, scenery, wildlife habitat, 
wetlands, or similar features of scientific or educational value.209 
7. Undeveloped Lands 
An additional description of undeveloped lands of ten acres or 
more is offered in title III(G) to categorize parcels that are afforded 
protection from nuisance lawsuits.210  Undeveloped parcels include 
lands used for farmlands, forests, and natural areas that may be used 
for outdoor recreational activities, hunting, forestry, scenic views, and 
ecological functions.211  Undeveloped lands cannot have any structure 
used for human habitation, building used for confined animal 
production, nor any building used for a commercial purpose that is 
not directly related to use of the land as farmland, forest, or a natural 
area.212  Outhouses, lean-to shelters, historical and educational 
structures, and minor farm buildings are permitted on lands.213 
 
 204. Id. tit. III(E). 
 205. Id.  See also P. Pengthamkeerati ET AL., Soil Carbon Dioxide Efflux from a Claypan 
Soil Affected by Surface Compaction and Applications of Poultry Litter, 109 AGRIC., 
ECOSYSTEMS & ENV’T 75, 77 (2005). 
 206. Tit. III(E), infra app. 2.  When poultry litter is applied to land as a fertilizer, the issues 
of smell and water contamination are similar to those created by the application of manure. 
 207. Id. tit. III(F) (adopting the ten-acre minimum as used for farmlands). 
 208. Id.  Natural areas may overlap with forests, and both constitute undeveloped lands. 
 209. Id. (adopting ideas describing natural areas for a Washington land preservation statute, 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 79.70.020 (West 2001 & Supp. 2006)). 
 210. Id. tit. III(G) (adopting the ten-acre minimum used for farmlands). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id.  This relates to the purpose of the act to protect lands in their unaltered state.  The 
provision attempts to allow expected utility or farm out-buildings that do not detract from the 
preservation of lands.  Simultaneously, the act does protect activities at buildings used for 
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The intent of this definition is to include lands that retain 
significant resource attributes.  In some cases, undeveloped lands may 
be accompanied by a building or paved area serving a business 
need.214  Rather than disqualifying the undeveloped portion of the 
parcel, nonqualifying buildings or paved areas on plots connected to 
farmlands, forests, or natural areas may be deemed separate parcels 
not covered by the act.215 
D. Exceptions to the Protection 
The broad coverage of activities on undeveloped lands may be 
misinterpreted to cover some conditions that should not be exempted 
from nuisance law.216  Therefore, ULPA’s title IV sets forth nine 
exceptions that delineate activities for which there is no anti-nuisance 
protection.217  The activities covered by these exceptions are 
insufficiently related to the economy of nature or so onerous that 
neighbors should retain their common law right of nuisance to seek 
judicial relief.218 
1. Nonapplication of the Act 
The first group of four exceptions concerns situations where the 
anti-nuisance protection accorded by ULPA does not apply.219  
Following right-to-farm laws, ULPA provides that any activity 
conducted in a malicious, improper, or negligent manner does not 
 
businesses or activities that do not need to be conducted on lands covered by the act.  See id. tit. 
IV(B)(1)-(2) (listing buildings as not being within the anti-nuisance protection afforded by 
ULPA). 
 213. Id. tit. III(G) (allowing unobtrusive structures).  The objective is to protect lands, 
recognizing that a few minor structures may not notably detract from the resources associated 
with the parcel. 
 214. For example, historic, educational, or scientific undeveloped areas may have buildings 
for exhibits or rest rooms, and paved parking areas. 
 215. Tit. III(G), infra app. 2.  Farmlands and other lands may be accompanied by residences, 
barns, or other buildings.  While the anti-nuisance protection of ULPA is not intended to apply 
for the plots where these structures are located, ULPA is intended to apply to lands extending 
from these structures. 
 216. Nuisance law is intended to be the norm, with the anti-nuisance defense of ULPA 
limited to special situations. 
 217. Tit. IV, infra app. 2. As might be expected, these exceptions severely restrict the 
coverage of the act. 
 218. Id.  These ideas are taken from various right-to-farm laws and reported nuisance cases.  
See infra Part D.1—2 (discussing the coverage of ULPA’s title IV, which disqualifies certain 
onerous or unncessearcy activies from protection under the act). 
 219. Id. tit., IV(A). 
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qualify for anti-nuisance protection.220  Allied with this exception is a 
provision asserting that an activity not in conformity with federal, 
state, and local law, ordinance, regulation (including a zoning 
regulation), or permit issued by a governmental agency cannot claim 
anti-nuisance protection.221  These exceptions should be important in 
precluding undeserving activities from qualifying for the anti-
nuisance defense. 
A case from the state of Washington illustrates the need for an 
exception regarding violations.222  In Gill v. LDI, plaintiffs, suing for 
nuisance, alleged that defendant’s activities polluted waters flowing 
into the plaintiffs’ pond.223  In opposition to the’ right-to-farm law 
defense,224 the court cited admitted violations of a permit issued 
pursuant to the Clean Water Act.225  Under the right-to-farm law, a 
nuisance that involves the violation of a permit requirement subjects 
the violator to damages.226  The anti-nuisance exception was not 
intended to serve as a defense to nuisances by a defendant who fails 
 
 220. Tit. IV(A)(1), infra app. 2.  See also 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/3 (West 2002) 
(establishing that the anti-nuisance defense is not available “whenever a nuisance results from 
the negligent or improper operation of any farm or its appurtenances.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-
22.29(A) (1994) (providing the anti-nuisance defense is not available for negligent or improper 
operations); Concerned Area Residents for the Env’t v. Southview Farms, 834 F. Supp. 1410, 
1419 & 1421 (W.D.N.Y. 1993), rev’d on other grounds, 34 F.3d 114, 120-121 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(noting the right-to-farm law required sound agricultural practices and that the defendants had 
alleged improper manure application); Margaret Rosso Grossman, Biotechnology, Property 
Rights and the Environment, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 215, 234 (Supp. 2002) (noting that right-to-farm 
laws often protect farmers only if their practices are not negligent or improper); Randall Wayne 
Hanna, Right to Farm Statutes–The Newest Tool in Agricultural Land Preservation, 10 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 415, 430-31 (1982) (concluding the most common type of right-to-farm law normally 
does not offer protection to the negligent conduct or improper operation of an agricultural 
activity). 
 221. Tit. IV(A)(2), infra app. 2 (adopting this statement from right-to-farm laws).  See, e.g., 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 561.19, subdiv. 2(a)(2) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006).  See also Grossman & 
Fischer, supra note 1, at 117 (observing the requirement of conformity with laws). 
 222. Gill v. LDI, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1198-99 (W.D. Wash. 1998) (finding that the 
defendant could not benefit from the right-to-farm statute because it had not engaged in “good 
forestry practices” due to violation of water quality laws’). 
 223. Id. at 1191 (concerning water pollution from quarrying activities). 
 224. Gill, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 1200 (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.48.300, 305 (West 1992 
& Supp. 2006)). 
 225. Gill, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 1198-99 (involving violations of a National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System permit). 
 226. Id. at 1198 (citing Tiegs v. Watts, 954 P.2d 877, 884-85 (Wash. 1998), which found that 
the violation of a permit constituted a nuisance when it “unreasonably interferes with the use 
and enjoyment of another’s property.”). 
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to employ good practices.227  Violation of duly enacted regulatory 
proscriptions shows the absence of good practices.228  Thus, the right-
to-farm defense was not available. 
While title IV(A)(2) supports the enforcement of local actions, 
simultaneously, some type of limitation on interferences with 
activities on undeveloped lands by local governments is needed.229  
Title VI addresses this issue by precluding local governments from 
interfering with production and management activities on 
undeveloped lands conducted according to generally accepted 
practices.230  Differentiating between permitted local actions and 
unpermitted local interferences with activities on undeveloped lands 
is challenging.  ULPA intends to preclude local governments from 
enacting laws, ordinances, or regulations that interfere with 
agricultural and forestry production activities.231  But, local 
governments can control activities such as the storage of abandoned 
cars, worn tires, and other nuisance activities,232 as ULPA does not 
offer protection to property owners who are not in compliance with 
provisions concerning these types of nuisances.233 
ULPA’s title IV(A)(3) makes it clear that the act does not afford 
a defense against any action regarding a diseased plant or animal or 
harboring a pest that is injurious to human welfare or health.234  
 
 227. Id. at 1200 (interpreting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.48.300, .305 and noting the 
failure of the defendant to engage in good practices).  See also Flo-Sun, Inc. v. Kirk, 783 So.2d 
1029, 1036 (Fla. 2001) (interpreting that nonqualifying agricultural activities could be found to 
be public nuisances despite the statutory defense of the Florida right-to-farm law). 
 228. Gill, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 1200. 
 229. Otherwise, local governments may pass ordinances or local laws that impede the 
preservation of undeveloped lands. 
 230.  See tit. IV, infra app. 2. 
 231. See id.  See also infra notes 316-344 and accompanying text. 
 232. See, e.g., Hedrick v. Pfeiffer, 10 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1107 (D. Neb. 1998) (affirming action 
by a city government to abate a nuisance consisting of wrecked or abandoned cars, unused 
machinery, and other items). 
 233. Tit. IV(A)(2), infra app. 2,  See also Northville Twp. v. Coyne, 429 N.W.2d 185, 187 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (finding that although the defendant qualified for the anti-nuisance 
defense of the state’s right-to-farm law, the defendant could be penalized for violating a local 
building permit requirement). 
 234. Tit. IV(A)(3), infra app. 2. Cf. Altman v. Town of Amherst, 190 F.Supp. 2d 467, 468 
(W.D.N.Y. 2001) (upholding a mosquito spraying program to control “nuisance and vector 
mosquitoes”); Ex rel. Lockyer v. Sun Pac. Farming Co., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 115, 119 (Cal. Ct. App.  
2000) (affirming injunctive relief for a public nuisance that ordered the removal of citrus trees 
infected with a virus); Gleaves v. Waters, 220 Cal. Rptr. 621, 623 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) 
(acknowledging the right to abate a public nuisance consisting of an invasion of Japanese 
beetles); Kaso v. Ohio Dep’t of Health, 794 N.E.2d 776, 778, 784 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 2003) (finding the 
department of health not liable for damages involving a program developed to combat a rabies 
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Because ULPA does not affect governmental police-power actions to 
control diseases and pests, efforts to control such on undeveloped 
lands are not affected.235  Preventing the introduction of a disease or 
pest is important for the continued viability of a land use.236  Cotton 
production was decimated by the introduction of the boll weevil in 
1892, and has cost our country more than $22 billion.237  Red fire ants 
are estimated to cause more that $1 billion of damages per year in the 
southern United States.238  Formosan termites cause a similar amount 
of damage.239  More recent concerns about bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (mad cow disease) illustrate the need to definitively 
allow governments to take appropriate action to control diseases and 
pests.240 
 
epidemic); Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found. Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 462 (Tex. 
1997) (finding that the boll weevil constituted a public nuisance and “eradication of the boll 
weevil is a proper subject for regulation by the State pursuant to its police power.”).  But see 
Dep’t Agric. & Consum. Serv. v. Polk, 568 So.2d 35, 40 n.4 (Fla. 1990) (finding the plants 
infected with a bacterial disease did not create a nuisance so that the destruction of nearby 
plants was a compensable taking). 
 235. State and federal governments faced with emergencies due to infestation of an insect 
may take appropriate action that damages private property.  Teresi v. California., 225 Cal. Rptr. 
517 (Cal. Ct. App.. 1986) (considering an emergency consisting of an invasion by Mediterranean 
fruit flies).  Moreover, damages resulting from a police-power response to an emergency are 
excepted from the constitutional requirement that compensation be paid for property taken for 
public use.  Id. at 518-19 (observing that property damage resulting from a valid exercise of the 
police power to avoid an impending peril does not need to be compensated).  This police-power 
response is not absolute; rather, emergencies that are not extreme or those that lack necessity 
may not justify a governmental invasion of property and, therefore, require compensation as a 
“taking” of private property.  See Royal C. Gardner, Invoking Private Property Rights for 
Environmental Purposes: The Takings Implications of Governmental-Authorized Aerial 
Pesticide Spraying, 18 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 65, 88-93 (1999) (discussing how the aerial application 
of pesticides to control an outbreak of Mediterranean fruit flies might constitute a taking). 
 236. David Pimentel et al., Environmental and Economic Costs of Nonindigenous Species in 
the United States, 50 BIOSCIENCE 53, 58 (2000) (reporting that the European green crab has 
caused the demise of the New England and maritime Canadian softshell clam industry with an 
estimated loss of $44 million per year in economic returns). 
 237. James Coppedge & Robert M. Faust, Winning the Weevil War: Beating a $22 Billion 
Bug, AGRIC. RES., Feb. 2003, at 2 (highlighting how researchers have achieved control over the 
boll weevil). 
 238. Pimentel et al., supra note 236, at 57-58 (calculating damages from estimates from 
Texas). 
 239. Id. at 58. 
 240. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MAD COW DISEASE: IMPROVEMENT IN THE 
ANIMAL FEED BAN AND OTHER REGULATORY AREAS WOULD STRENGTHEN U.S. 
PREVENTION EFFORTS, GAO 02-183 (Jan. 2002) (recommending stronger enforcement 
measures and increased inspections to preclude the introduction of bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy); Editorial, Testing Madness, SCI. AM. 8, July 2004, at 8 (commenting that only 
cattle older than 30 months should be tested for bovine spongiform encephalopathy). 
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Title IV(A)(4) addresses conditions injurious to public health or 
safety and excludes them from protection against nuisance lawsuits.241  
Three categories of activities are enumerated.  An improperly built or 
improperly maintained septic tank, water closet, or privy is not 
protected by the Act.242  Untreated or improperly treated human 
waste, garbage, offal, dead animal or waste from a slaughtered animal 
remains subject to nuisance law.243  Dangerous waste materials and 
gas which are harmful to human or animal life are excepted.244  
ULPA’s text makes it clear that public health and safety laws and 
ordinances based on preventing public nuisances are not affected.245 
2. Activities Subject to Nuisance Law 
A second group of exceptions for the anti-nuisance protection 
accorded by title IV(B) involves business activities that are not within 
the economy of nature paradigm.246  It is felt that these activities are 
not necessary for the protection of lands so that neighboring property 
owners should be burdened with associated nuisances.247  Rather, 
these activities involve business choices that are appropriately 
addressed by community standards, nuisance law, and land use 
regulations.248 
The initial business activity subject to nuisance law involves 
activities in buildings and structures used for milling inputs, 
 
 241. Tit. IV(A)(4), infra app. 2 (adopting language from the New Hampshire right-to-farm 
law, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432:33 (2002), whereby the law is not applicable to any aspect of 
an agricultural operation that is injurious to public health or safety). 
 242. Id. tit. IV(A)(4)(a). 
 243. Id. tit. IV(A)(4)(b). 
 244. Id. tit. IV(A)(4)(c) (adopting exceptions from the Florida right-to-farm law, FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 823.14(4)(a)(1)-(4) (West 2006)). 
 245. Id. tit. IV(A).  A case from Washington serves to show how the anti-nuisance exception 
would be limited.  Costello v. Weyerhauser Co., 1998 Wash. App. LEXIS 1746 (Wash. Ct. App. 
Dec. 11, 1998). Plaintiffs had alleged a nuisance for defendant’s failure to control hunters on its 
property.  Id. at *7.  The issue involved the defendant taking appropriate action to keep 
neighbors safe from hunting activities.  Id. at *8.  The court found that the plaintiff had 
advanced facts to maintain a nuisance lawsuit. Id. at *16.  Similarly, an allegation of a nuisance 
based upon safety would not be precluded by ULPA.  Tit IV(A)(4), infra app. 2. 
 246. Id. tit. IV(B). 
 247. Id.  As an exception to nuisance law, the anti-nuisance protection should be limited to 
deserving activities.  The activities are those that normally occur on undeveloped lands, and 
tend to exclude activities relating to business practices. 
 248. Id.  A state’s nuisance law and anti-nuisance legislation already provide a resolution for 
nuisance disputes involving business activities.  All right-to-farm laws derogate common law 
nuisance for qualifying agricultural business activities and a few laws derogate nuisance for non-
agricultural business activities.  See, e.g., 3 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 951-954 (limiting nuisance 
protection to agricultural operations). 
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manufacturing agricultural and forestry products, or processing 
products.249  A case from Georgia involving a business which 
manufactured utility poles from untreated logs250 shows why ULPA 
declines to offer an anti-nuisance defense to businesses.  In Roberts v. 
Southern Wood Piedmont Co., a homeowner sued for relief from 
noise and vibrations from the nearby manufacturing facility.251  In 
reversing a directed verdict for the defendant, the court noted the 
homeowner had advanced a claim in nuisance.252  Allegations of 
changes at the facility in 1980 causing noise and vibrations showed a 
new unreasonable interference with the plaintiff’s “use and 
enjoyment of her property.”253  While a legislature may choose to 
promote commercial and industrial activities, as occurs under many 
right-to-farm laws, ULPA is intended to only protect natural 
resources.254  Business activities involving the processing and 
marketing of agricultural and forestry products do not qualify for the 
anti-nuisance protections offered by ULPA.255 
 
 249. Id. tit. IV(B)(1). 
 250. Roberts v. S. Wood Piedmont Co., 328 S.E.2d 391 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985). 
 251. Id. at 392 (averring that the loading and unloading of logs caused the noise and 
vibrations).  While the facility had been existence for many years, it was the increase in the 
noise and vibrations that led to the lawsuit.  Id. 
 252. Id. at 393. 
 253. Id. (noting the Georgia right-to-farm law was not applicable because the law did not 
cover the facility). 
 254. Tit. 1, infra app. 2.  Actually, right-to-farm laws are mixed on protecting business 
activities.  A few protect businesses.  Compare Erbrich Products Co. v. Wills, 509 N.E.2d 850, 
857 & 859-60 (Ind. Ct. App.. 1987) (finding a facility used for manufacturing bleach was 
protected by an anti-nuisance statute), and Horne v. Haladay, 728 A.2d 954, 956 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1999) (finding that a new poultry operation housing 122,000 laying hens qualified for the anti-
nuisance protection afforded by the Pennsylvania right-to-farm law), with Trickett v. Ochs, 838 
A.2d 66, 68-69 (Vt. 2003) (finding that new activities involving the storage and marketing of 
apples were not protected by the Vermont right-to-farm law with respect to the plaintiffs’ prior 
residential use).’ 
 255. Tit. IV(B), infra app. 2. 
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The next two provisions involve animal production.256  The 
production of animals in buildings, feedlots, and pens at a 
concentrated animal feeding operation, as defined by state law, 
entails a business activity of a character quite different from the land 
resources being afforded protection by ULPA.257  Likewise, the 
disposal of animal waste via lagoons and spray fields are specialized 
business responses that can be especially egregious.258  Neighbors 
should not have to accept the aggravating situations that accompany 
these business activities, so ULPA provides that they remain subject 
 
 256. Id. tit. IV(B)(2)-(3).  Problems associated with confined animal production have 
received considerable attention.  Cf.  Charles W. Abdalla, The Industrialization of Agriculture: 
Implications for Public Concern and Environmental Consequences of Intensive Livestock 
Operations, 10 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 175, 190-91 (2002) (advocating greater regulatory 
attention to jurisdictional boundaries for regulating animals); Theodore A. Feitshans & Kelly 
Zering, Federal Regulation of Animal and Poultry Production Under the Clean Water Act: 
Opportunities for Employing Economic Analysis to Improve Societal Results, 10 PENN ST. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 193, 212-15 (2002) (advocating regulations that consider social welfare and 
efficiency); David R. Gillay, Oklahoma’s Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations Act: 
Balancing the Interests of Landowners with the Exponential Growth of the Hog Industry, 35 
TULSA L.J. 627, 642-49 (2000) (analyzing one state’s regulations of concentrated animal feeding 
operations); Michael Steeves, The EPA’s Proposed CAFO Regulations Fall Short of Ensuring 
the Integrity of Our Nation’s Waters, 22 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 367 (2002) (discussing 
problems with concentrated animal feeding operation regulations). 
 257. Infra App. 2, tit. IV(B)(2) (adopting a qualification in the Minnesota right-to-farm law 
differentiating confined animal feeding operations, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 561.19, subdiv. 2(c)(1) 
(West 2000 & Supp. 2006)).  Regulating the size of a confined animal operation addresses the 
issue of how much an operation may expand and still qualify for the protection of a right-to-
farm law.  See also Nickels v. Burnett, 798 N.E.2d 817, 821-26 (Ill.App. Dist. 2003) (enjoining 
defendants from constructing a hog confinement facility as a prospective nuisance given the 
high probability that the facility would be a nuisance); Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders Ltd. P’ship, 
134 Wash.2d 673, 681-85 (Wash. 1998) (observing that the plaintiffs had come to rangeland and 
that the lagoon and spray field were developed later, creating a nuisance that was not protected 
by the right-to-farm law)’.  But see Crea v. Crea, 16 P.3d 922, 925 (Idaho 2000); Payne v. Skaar, 
900 P.2d 1352, 1355-56 (Idaho 1995) (arguing that the expansion of a feedlot should be 
protected by the right-to-farm law).’’ 
 258. Tit. IV(B)(3), infra app. 2.  The Act clarifies that lagoons and spray fields do not 
qualify for anti-nuisance protection.  The objectionable nature of lagoons and spray fields also 
involve health issues.  See Dana Cole et al., Concentrated Swine Feeding Operations and Public 
Health: A Review of Occupational and Community Health Effects, 108 ENVTL. HEALTH 
PERSPECTIVES 685, 685-96 (2000) (reviewing health issues associated with the swine industry); 
ROBBIN MARKS, CESSPOOLS OF SHAME: HOW FACTORY FARM LAGOONS AND SPRAYFIELDS 
THREATEN ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH 117-60 (2001), available at 
http://www.nrdc.org/water/pollution/cesspools/cesspools.pdf; K.M. Thu, Public Health Concerns 
for Neighbors of Large-Scale Swine Production Operations, 8 J. AGRIC. SAFETY & HEALTH 175, 
176-82 (2002) (reporting health problems associated with the swine industry); Keynen J. Wall, 
Knowing When To Say When To Hog Waste: Do State Lagoon Regulations Adequately Protect 
Ground Water in Kansas?, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 113, 118-19 (2001) (finding that animal 
waste poses a threat to drinking water supplies). 
01__CENTNER.DOC 2/6/2007  4:55 PM 
Fall 2006] UNDEVELOPED LAND PROTECTION 37 
to nuisance law.259  Conversely, the production of animals at a facility 
that is not a concentrated animal feeding operation and the 
appropriate application of manure are activities within the scope of 
the anti-nuisance protection afforded by the Act..260 
A Minnesota animal nuisance case displays a factual situation 
where ULPA would not support an anti-nuisance defense.261  In 
Wendinger v. Forst Farms, Inc., neighbors claimed that a hog 
confinement facility created a nuisance.262  The facility had an outdoor 
concrete manure lagoon and the contents of the lagoon were pumped 
and spread on fields each autumn.263  By presenting evidence that the 
defendant intentionally maintained a condition that was offensive to 
the senses, the plaintiffs established an actionable claim in nuisance.264  
The protection of natural resources under ULPA is not intended to 
interfere with nuisance actions for facilities with concentrated animal 
production, lagoons, or spray fields.265 
ULPA is also not intended to preclude nuisance actions 
involving the clear-cutting of timber or the development of roads.266  
With respect to the provision for the clear-cutting of timber, the 
Supreme Court of Washington has held that this practice was not 
protected under Washington anti-nuisance provisions.267  However, 
the court’s decision was based upon the coming to the nuisance 
doctrine and the fact that the defendant had never logged the 
property.268  To clarify that the anti-nuisance protection does not 
 
 259. Tit. IV(B)(2)-(3), infra app. 2. 
 260. See id. tits. III(B), V(B) (clarifying the coverage of these activities). 
 261. Wendinger v. Forst Farms, Inc., 662 N.W.2d 546 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003). 
 262. Id. at 549.  The plaintiffs also alleged a trespass but the court found that the odors 
complained of did not interfere with their “exclusive possession” of land but rather with their 
“use and enjoyment.”  Id. at 550. 
 263. Id. at 549.  This facility became operational in 1995, replacing livestock production that 
had involved animal waste mixed with straw that was hauled away in solid form.  Id. 
 264. Id. at 551-552 (rejecting the defendant’s argument that a nuisance claim had to be 
supported by evidence of “wrongful conduct”). 
 265. Tit. IV(B)(2)-(3), infra app. 2.  But see Charter Twp. of Shelby v. Papesh, 704 N.W.2d 
92, 104 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (denying plaintiff’s summary judgment on a nuisance claim 
against a poultry operation due to the possibility that the right-to-farm law provided a defense); 
Horne v. Haladay, 728 A.2d 954, 955 (Pa. Super.  Ct. 1999) (finding that allegations concerning 
a poultry operation interfering with plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of their property was defeated 
by the Pennsylvania right-to-farm law). 
 266. Tit. IV(B)(4), infra app. 2. 
 267. Alpental Cmty. Club, Inc. v. Seattle Gymnastics Soc’y, 111 P.3d 257, 262 (Wash. 2005) 
(declining to find that the clear-cutting of a slope was shielded by an anti-nuisance statute). 
 268. Id. 
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apply to clear-cutting, an exception denying its coverage is 
warranted.269 
Another exception from the anti-nuisance protection includes 
activities involving sewage sludge.270  The aboveground application or 
storage of sewage sludge for the production of crops or forest 
products is not accorded anti-nuisance protection under ULPA.271  
Due to the potential that these activities might involve significant 
adverse consequences for neighboring landowners, they are more 
appropriately handled by existing nuisance law and other 
regulations.272 
A state may desire that the anti-nuisance protection of ULPA 
not apply in some areas where there is no justification for changing 
nuisance law.273  Any activity on lands within an incorporated city 
might remain subject to nuisance lawsuits.274  This provision would be 
tailored by each state for governmental subdivisions in which lands 
should not be granted anti-nuisance protection.275  Presumably, a 
legislature would not want the protection to apply in an area where 
concentrations of human activities mean there is little justification for 
protecting nuisances and where nuisances on governmental 
 
 269. Tit. IV(B)(4), infra app. 2 (stating that the “clear cutting of timber and development of 
roads” remains subject to nuisance law).  This is due to the fact that clear-cutting is not 
considered to be an appropriate activity due to accompanying ecological harm.  See Stuart L. 
Pimm et al., Can We Defy Nature’s End?, 293 SCIENCE 2207, 2207 (2001) (observing that clear-
cutting can adversely affect biodiveristy); Charles R. Scott, Note, Liquidation Timber 
Harvesting in Maine: Potential Policy Approaches, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 251, 256-57 (2005) 
(observing that clear-cutting has detrimental consequences on soils and the ecology). 
 270. Tit IV(B)(5), infra app. 2. 
 271. Id. (adopting a provision from the Virginia right-to-farm law, VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-
22.28 (1994), regarding the application of sewage sludge to allow local governments to regulate 
this activity). 
 272. See Blanton v. Amelia County, 540 S.E.2d 869, 875 (Va. 2001) (finding that a state 
statute regulating the application of sewage sludge preempted the challenged county 
ordinances). Cf., Hydropress Envtl. Serv., Inc. v. Twp. of Upper Mount Bethel, 836 A.2d 912, 
920 (Pa. 2003) (finding that regulation of the land application of sewage sludge by a county 
ordinance was not preempted by the state’s Solid Waste Management Act but the local 
government exceeded its police power in enacting its ordinance regulating sludge). 
 273. See tit. IV(C), infra app. 2. Some states limit anti-nuisance protection to lands within 
agricultural districts.  See N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW §§ 308(3) (McKinney 2004). 
 274. Id. (adopting a provision from the South Dakota right to farm law, S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 21-10-25.5 (2004), whereby the right-to-farm law does not apply “within the limits of 
any incorporated municipality”). 
 275. Id.  States have varied individualized rules concerning local governmental units.  A 
legislature may decide that anti-nuisance protection is not appropriate for a category of local 
unit.  See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.295(4) (West 2000) (declining to provide anti-nuisance 
protection to activities in cities, towns, and villages). 
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properties, such as parks, are already accorded other forms of 
protection.276 
E. Retained Rights 
In absence of further clarification, ULPA might be interpreted 
expansively to provide anti-nuisance protection against a few claims 
that should be retained.277  Alternatively, ULPA might be interpreted 
to interfere with manure application practices that should continue to 
be viable.278  Title V of the Act specifically addresses four categories 
of rights to acknowledge their intended resolution under the Act.279 
1. Unaffected Claims 
Title V(A) identifies three groups of claims that are not affected 
by the Act.280  The first group involves damages for activities in 
violation of any federal, state, or local statute or governmental 
regulation, permit, or court order.281  ULPA does not impact liability 
for violations of existing legal provisions.  The second category of 
claims involves damages for pollution, discharges, overflows, and 
trespasses.282  ULPA is not intended to eliminate liability for activities 
 
 276. Id.  Protection may occur under governmental or sovereign immunity provisions.  See 
Christina Bohannan, Beyond Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity: State Waivers, Private 
Contracts, and Federal Incentives, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 273, 289-303 (2002) (examining situations 
where states may waive their sovereign immunity); Alfred Hill, In Defense of Our Law of 
Sovereign Immunity, 42 B.C. L. REV. 485, 489 (2001) (arguing that sovereign immunity in the 
United States developed independently from English law); Daniel J. Meltzer, Overcoming 
Immunity: The Case of Federal Regulation of Intellectual Property, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1331, 1375-
89 (2001) (offering ideas for Congress to subject states to damages liability for violations of 
intellectual property rights); Jonathan R. Siegel, Waivers of State Sovereign Immunity and the 
Ideology of the Eleventh Amendment, 52 DUKE L.J. 1167, 1243 (2003) (examining our 
“nonsensical scheme” of waivers of sovereign immunity that has “left the federal judicial system 
helpless to prevent manifest injustice and waste of judicial resources.”). 
 277. For example. flooding and violations of existing legal provisions. 
 278. Such as the agronomic application of manure. 
 279. Tit. V, infra app. 2. 
 280. Id. tit. V(A). 
 281. Id. tit. V(A)(1).  While it may be obvious that an anti-nuisance law simply addresses 
nuisance causes of action, a more definitive statement will prevent defenses such as that 
asserted in State ex. rel. Miller v. DeCoster, 596 N.W.2d 898 (Iowa 1999), whereby the defendant 
hog-producer sought to violate waste control requirements via the state’s right to farm statute.  
See infra notes 285-296 and accompanying text for a discussion of the case. 
 282. Tit. V(A)(2), infra app. 2 (incorporating provisions from the Illinois Right-To-Farm 
statute, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/4 (West 2002) that precludes nuisance protection for 
polluting and overflow events causing damages). 
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that that led to physical damages of another’s property.283  If an 
activity constitutes a violation, leads to pollution, or involves a 
trespass, the adversely affected party may advance a claim for 
resulting damages.284 
A case from Iowa illustrates why it is helpful to state explicitly 
that citizens remain liable for damages from a violation of an existing 
regulatory or statutory requirement.285  In State ex. rel. Miller v. 
DeCoster, the Iowa Attorney General sued a hog producer for 
violations involving improper spray irrigation of hog waste and 
inadequacies in an earthen waste storage basin.286  DeCoster refused 
to take responsibility for his actions, claiming that the state’s 
enforcement action of its water pollution and animal waste control 
requirements was unwarranted by the facts.287  Regarding the spray 
irrigation, DeCoster argued that his introduction of pollutants to 
navigable waters was indirect, so there could be no liability.288  In 
rejecting this argument, the court noted that a loophole for indirect 
actions would not provide meaningful protection against pollution.289 
For charges concerning violations of a storage basin regulation, 
DeCoster claimed that the violation was not foreseeable due to his 
 
 283. Id.  See also Simon v. Neises, 395 P.2d 308, 312 (Kan. 1964) (observing that the 
maintenance of a levee causing increased volume of surface water to damage an adjacent 
property constituted a continuing nuisance); Meyers v. Kissner, 594 N.E.2d 336, 340 (Ill. 1992) 
(finding that property owners could incur liability under the law for continuing nuisances for 
constructing earthen levees that obstructed the natural flow of water, causing injury to plaintiff’s 
farmland). 
 284. Tit. V(A)(1)-(2), infra app. 2 (drawing upon the language of a number of right-to-farm 
laws including 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/4 (West 2002), KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.072(6) 
(West 2005), 3 PA. STAT. ANN. § 955 (West 1995), and VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-22.29(C) (1994)). 
 285. State ex. rel. Miller v. DeCoster, 596 N.W.2d 898 (Iowa 1999).  See also State ex. rel. 
Miller v. DeCoster, 608 N.W.2d 785, 792 (Iowa 2000) (contesting the imposition of “a strict 
liability standard for the discharge of waste into the state’s watercourses.”); Gill v. LDI, 19 F. 
Supp. 2d 1188, 1200 (W.D. Wash. 1998) (finding the right-to-farm affirmative defense was not 
applicable since defendants had violated several water quality laws).  But see Horne v. Haladay, 
728 A.2d 954, 958 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (finding that an allegation that the defendant was 
violating a statute or regulation was not proven). 
 286. 596 N.W.2d at 900-01.  Evidence showed that tile drains from the spray application field 
were discharging a dark putrid liquid into a stream running into the Iowa River.  Id. 901-02.  
The violation involving the earthen storage basin involved waste overtopping the berm.  Id. at 
903. 
 287. Id. at 902-03. 
 288. Id. at 902-03 (arguing that the liquid waste was sprayed on fields and only entered a 
river after passing through a tile under the field indirectly).  The defendant claimed that 
culpability under the Iowa law required direct pollution.  Id. (citing IOWA CODE § 455B.186(1) 
(1995)). 
 289. Id. at 902 (noting the absurdity of such an interpretation as it would render pollution 
statutes meaningless). 
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lack of specific information.290  The court noted that the issue was 
actually whether the trier of fact believed DeCoster’s testimony that 
he did not know about the problem, as opposed to contrary evidence 
produced by another witness.291  Evidence to knowledge supported 
the finding of the district court; thus the ruling that DeCoster had 
violated water pollution provisions was upheld.292 
A year later, this same defendant again sought relief from the 
Supreme Court of Iowa from a judgment concerning a strict liability 
standard for violating a state statute.293  Again, the court declined to 
interpret the pollution statute as urged by DeCoster.294  The tenacity 
of this defendant in attempting to escape liability for pollution shows 
a need for an unequivocal provision in ULPA that people remain 
liable for damages regarding violations of law.295  Furthermore, the 
definitive statement concerning violations, discharges, overflows, and 
trespasses make it obvious that strict liability standards incorporated 
in pollution statutes remain as causes of action.296 
For discharges, overflows, and trespasses, the Georgia case of 
Lincoln v. Tyler concerning damages for excessive stormwater and 
sediment discharges evinces why such actions should not receive 
protection against nuisance lawsuits.297  Developers had constructed a 
subdivision that caused discharges onto plaintiffs’ property causing 
damages.298  Although, there was evidence of a “minimal amount of 
sediment deposits from the subdivision onto plaintiffs’ property” and 
“inadequately maintained” sediment control structures, the trial court 
granted summary judgment for the defendant.299  In reversing the trial 
 
 290. Id. at 903 (claiming that his employee was not warned of the freeboard level at the 
earthen basin, so his conduct was not a substantial factor in producing the violation). 
 291. Id. (acknowledging that plaintiff’s argument would be true if he had established his 
version of the facts). 
 292. Id. at 903. 
 293. State ex. rel. Miller v. DeCoster, 608 N.W.2d 785, 792 (Iowa 2000) (concerning a 
violation of IOWA CODE § 455B.191 (1997)). 
 294. Id. (affirming the judgment for the state). 
 295. Tit. V(A)(1)-(2), infra app. 2. 
 296. Id.  See State ex. rel. Miller, 596 N.W.2d at 902 (finding strict liability under IOWA 
CODE § 455B.186(1) (1995) for the discharge of a pollutant into state waters“”). 
 297. Lincoln v. Tyler, 574 S.E.2d 440, 442 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (affirming damages from 
sediment discharge based upon trespass and nuisance claims). 
 298. Tyler v. Lincoln, 527 S.E.2d 180, 181 (Ga. 2000) (considering an appeal concerning 
summary judgment denying punitive damages in favor of defendant). 
 299. Tyler v. Lincoln, 513 S.E.2d 6, 7-8 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 527 
S.E.2d 180 (Ga. 2000).  The ruling of this court supports the contention that plaintiffs often have 
difficulties in maintaining causes of action for discharges.  The case reveals the need for a 
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court’s ruling, the appellate court noted that the measure “of personal 
damages recoverable in a nuisance case is the enlightened conscience 
of the jury.”300  At the subsequent trial, the jury found for the 
plaintiffs on their trespass and nuisance claims.301  The provision on 
pollution, discharges, overflows, and trespasses in ULPA would 
assure that people remain liable for actionable damages and 
trespasses.302  The act does not sanction activities that physically 
invade or alter neighboring properties.303 
A third category of unaffected claims involves tort actions in 
which the attractive nuisance doctrine applies.304  Title V(A)(3) 
clearly states that the act does not apply to this doctrine.305  While this 
 
definitive statement in ULPA whereby actions for discharges do not qualify for the anti-
nuisance protection.  Tit. V(A)(2), infra app. 2. 
 300. Tyler, 513 S.E.2d at 9 (citing Arvida/JMB Partners v. Hadaway, 489 S.E.2d 125 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1997) and denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the nuisance, trespass, 
and negligence causes of action). 
 301. Lincoln v. Tyler, 574 S.E.2d 440, 442 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (awarding $43,000 in special 
damages and $90,000 in attorney fees and expenses of litigation). 
 302. Infra app. 2, tit. V(A)(2).  The California right-to-farm law provides a contrary 
resolution.  See Rancho Viejo v. Tres Amigos Viejos, LLC, 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 479, 494 (Ct. App. 
2002).  In watering crops, runoff irrigation water flowed onto the plaintiff’s property causing 
damage.  Id.  In responding to a suit for damages, the court interpreted the California right-to-
farm law as covering “traditional farming operations.”  Id. at 491.  While the law covered 
nuisances, the court found an intent to cover “ongoing, standard agricultural activities” 
regardless of the labeling of the conduct as a nuisance or trespass.  Id. at 488.  Since California 
law defines nuisances to include activities that intrude upon and cause physical damage to 
property, the anti-nuisance defense was available to defeat the claim regarding the runoff water.  
Id. at 489, 494.  See also Souza v. Lauppe, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494 (Ct. App. 1997) (granting 
summary judgment to defendants as the cause of action for water intrusion was precluded by 
the right-to-farm law). 
 303. Tit. V(A)(2), infra  app. 2.  Another case involving an action for flooding illustrates the 
importance of this provision.  Benton City v. Adrian, 748 P.2d 679 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).  In 
Benton City, farmers discharged excess irrigation water fouling a well serving a private 
residence, eroding an area to expose a City sanitary water line, and depositing sand and silt in 
an irrigation canal.  Id. at 680-81.  The City and owner of the irrigation canal sued for injunctive 
relief and damages.  Id. at 681.  On appeal, the Benton City court noted that the Washington 
right-to-farm law did not prevent the lawsuit for a trespass.  Id. at 681-682.  Under ULPA, 
damages for flooding would be allowed; adversely affected individuals will have protection 
against damages from discharges, flooding, and trespasses.  Tit. V(B)(2), infra app. 2.  This 
would include actions for damages for the construction of physical features that cause flooding.  
See, e.g.,  Grundy v. Thurston County, 117 P.3d 1089, 1094 (Wash. 2005) (allowing a nuisance 
cause of action for the construction of a sea wall that caused a property to be vulnerable to 
flooding). 
 304. Tit. V(A)(3), infra app. 2.  An attractive nuisance doctrine may apply to children to 
protect them from hidden, attractive dangers. 
 305. Id. (adopting the idea from a dispute in Washington State involving natural bodies of 
water, Degel v. Majestic Mobile Manor, 914 P.2d 728, 733 (Wash. 1995)). See also Fritts v. 
Clover Park Sch. Dist. No. 400, No. 30323-0-II, 2003 Wash. App. LEXIS 2895, at *5-9 (Wash. 
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may be obvious to most in the legal community, the inclusion of this 
provision should assure the public that ULPA does not affect the 
continued viability of this doctrine.306 
2. Further Clarification for Manure Application 
Title V(B) enumerates additional provisions for manure 
application to define rights that are not affected by ULPA.307  The act 
endorses the practice of applying manure to lands as a source of 
nutrients for plant growth because it is an agronomic practice that 
should be encouraged as part of sustainable production.308  This is in 
contrast to the over application of manure as a waste byproduct and 
concentrations of animals that may severely denigrate local 
environmental conditions.309 
Differentiating between acceptable manure application and 
unacceptable lagoons and spray fields is challenging.  ULPA retains 
nuisance rights against bothersome business activities involving 
lagoons and spray fields while exempting farming activities involving 
fertilization with manure.310  The distinction is that lagoons and spray 
fields involve business decisions to employ specialized technologies to 
handle wastes that are accompanied by a propensity for adversely 
affecting neighboring property owners, whereas manure application 
to fields is an agronomic practice consistent with the economy of 
nature.311  However, qualifications are needed to preclude 
 
Ct. App. 2003) (showing how the attractive nuisance doctrine works with a discussion of the 
elements needed for a young child to qualify).  
 306. Tit. V(A)(3), infra app. 2.  ULPA does not address distinctions for minors so does not 
affect the attractive nuisance doctrine; ULPA simply clarifies that the attractive nuisance 
doctrine remains in force.  Id. 
 307. Id. tit. V(B). 
 308. Id.  See Araji ET AL., supra note 202, at 179-80 (citing studies showing manure to 
constitute “a valuable bio-resource that should be utilized.”); Terence J. Centner, Developing 
Institutions to Encourage the Use of Animal Wastes as Production Inputs, 21 AGRIC. & HUMAN 
VALUES 367, 372 (2004) (advancing regulations that mandate selected production requirements 
or practices to remedy pollution problems). 
 309. See Tit. IV(B)(2)-(3), infra app. 2 (providing that concentrated animal feeding 
operations, lagoons, and spray fields do not receive protection against nuisance lawsuits). 
 310. Id. tits. IV(B)(3), V(B). 
 311. Id.  See also Community Ass’n for Restoration of the Env’t v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 
F.3d 943, 946-47 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding ongoing violations of the Clean Water Act by dairies 
discharging pollutants into navigable waters); United States v. New Portland Meadows, Inc., 
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19153, at *5-6 (D. Ore. July 30, 2002) (alleging a discharge of animal 
waste in violation of a condition in a state permit); Water Keeper Alliance, Inc. v. Smithfield 
Foods, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21314, at *3 (E.D. N.C. Sept. 20, 2001) (alleging violations of 
the Clean Water Act by North Carolina hog producers); Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. 
Supp. 2d 1169, 1173 (D. Idaho 2001) (alleging water contamination from a wastewater holding 
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unacceptable manure-application practices.312  Therefore, provisions 
from the federal regulations governing best management practices for 
the application of manure from concentrated animal feeding 
operations are incorporated into ULPA’s title V(B).313 
Manure application needs to be conducted pursuant to generally 
acceptable practices, including agronomic rate requirements.314  For 
applications to meet the agronomic rate requirement, the producer 
must develop and implement a nutrient management plan that 
incorporates application rates for manure that “minimize phosphorus 
and nitrogen transport from the field to surface waters in compliance 
with the technical standards for nutrient management.”315  Such 
technical standards include “a field-specific assessment of the 
potential for nitrogen and phosphorus transport from the field” to 
surface waters, address the application of nutrients on each field to 
achieve realistic production goals, and minimize nitrogen and 
phosphorus movement to surface waters.316  These requirements 
should allow an agronomic practice consistent with the economy of 
nature while minimizing adverse impacts on neighbors. 
 
pond); Community Ass’n for Restoration of the Env’t v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 65 F. Supp. 2d 
1129, 1132-33 (E.D. Wash. 1999) (alleging the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters by 
defendant dairies); Neuse River Found. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 574 S.E.2d 48, 50-51 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2002) (alleging pollution and contamination of navigable waters by North Carolina hog 
producers). ’  See also Araji, ET. AL., supra  note 202, at 190 (observing that animal manure is a 
biological resource with ecological benefits). 
 312. Tit. V(B)(1)-(2), infra app. 2.  See supra notes 255-265 (addressing concentrated animal 
feeding operations). 
 313. Id. (incorporating text from 40 C.F.R. pts. 122, 412 (2005) to prescribe best 
management practices for point-source concentrated animal feeding operations that apply 
manure to fields). 
 314. Id. tit. V(B)(1).  The issue of overapplication was noted in the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s comments accompanying the publication of new regulations for 
concentrated animal feeding operations.  National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
Permit Regulation and Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal 
Feeding Operations (CAFOs), 68 Fed. Reg. 7176, 7186 (Feb. 12, 2003) (preamble). 
 315. Tit. V(B)(1), infra app. 2 (adopting prescriptions on best management requirements for 
concentrated animal feeding operations from the federal regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 412.4(c)(2) 
(2005)). 
 316. Id. tit. V(B)(2) (adopting provisions from federal regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 412.4(c)(1) 
(2005)). 
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F. Local Governments 
Laws, ordinances, and regulations adopted by local governments 
(hereafter called local regulations) may contribute to the demise of 
land resources by interfering with agricultural and forestry 
practices.317  As a minority of the voting public,318 property owners 
seeking to preserve their farms and forestry operations may not be 
able to stop local regulations from interfering with their production 
and management practices.319  To preclude local interferences, 
ULPA’s title VI sets forth provisions that preempt certain local 
regulations.320 
The need for a preemption provision may be gleaned from two 
cases in which local regulations interfered with production activities.  
In the first case, the appellate court found that a local government 
 
 317. See Overgaard v. Rock County Bd. of Comm’rs, No. 02-601, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
13001, at *4-5 (D. Minn. July 25, 2003) (considering a local ordinance regulating animal 
feedlots); Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of San Mateo, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 159 (Ct. App. 1995) 
(considering a zoning ordinance that established a buffer where timber could not be harvested); 
Milan Twp. v. Jaworski, No. 240444, 2003 Mich. LEXIS 3105, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 
2003) (requiring a local permit to raise game birds); Villari v. Zoning Bd. of Adjust. of 
Deptford, 649 A.2d 98 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1994) (considering a zoning ordinance that established 
acreage requirements for raising pigs); French v. Mt. Jackson, No. 2606, 1985 Va. Cir. LEXIS 
109, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. July 2, 1985) (considering a provision of a town code that regulated 
weeds, grass, and foreign growth on property). 
 318. The farm population is estimated to comprise of less than three percent of the U.S. 
population.  EMERY N. CASTLE, AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE AMERICAN 
COUNTRYSIDE 12 (1998). 
 319. E.g., Pasco County v. Tampa Farm Serv., Inc., 573 So.2d 909 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) 
(involving the issue of whether a poultry producer could engage in a “wet manure distribution 
process”). 
 320. Tit. VI, infra app. 2 (adopting the idea from the Michigan right-to-farm law, MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 286.474(6) (West 2003 & Supp. 2006), that local governments should not 
enact any ordinance, regulation, or resolution that conflicts with the accepted agricultural and 
management practices developed under the state statute). See also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
35-3.5-102(5) (West 2005) (precluding ordinances and resolutions in certain cases); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 823.14(6) (West 2006) (precluding local ordinances that “prohibit, restrict, regulate, or 
otherwise limit an activity of a bona fide farm operation on land classified as agricultural land”); 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 22-4504 (2001) (limiting powers of local governments regarding zoning 
and ordinances that may interfere with agricultural practices); TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 
251.005 (Vernon 2004 & Supp. 2006) (establishing limitations on the regulation of existing 
agricultural operations for some local governments); H.B. 1646, § 1, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2005) 
(prohibiting local governments from adopting unauthorized local ordinances) (available at 
http://www.legis.state.pa.us) (in the “by Bill” window scroll to “2005-2006 Regular Session” and 
search “HB 1646” in the adjacent search bar); VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-22.28 (1994) (precluding 
county ordinances that require “a special exception or special use permit be obtained for any 
production agriculture or silviculture activity in an area that is zoned as an agricultural 
district”). 
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could interfere with a forestry practice.321  In the second case, the 
Michigan right-to-farm law operated to preclude a local ordinance 
that sought to control a nuisance activity.322  To effect the purposes set 
forth in ULPA’s title I, local governments must be precluded from 
interfering with production and management activities conducted 
according to generally accepted practices.323 
In Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of San Mateo, a California 
county adopted provisions in its zoning ordinance to address conflicts 
accompanying timber harvesting.324  The ordinance prohibited 
“commercial timber harvesting in designated rural areas of the 
County ‘within 1,000 feet of any legal dwelling. . . .’”325 A lumber 
company challenged the buffer requirement established by the 
ordinance claiming it was preempted by the Z’berg-Nejedly Forest 
Practice Act of 1973.326  The court found that the state statute 
preempted local regulation of timber harvesting but not regulations 
defining where timber may be harvested.327  In upholding the county’s 
buffer requirement, the court affirmed the ability of a county to enact 
regulations for parcels not designated in timber production zones and 
to preclude harvesting on these parcels.328  Thus, in California, local 
governments can interfere with timber production.  Under ULPA, 
local governments retain their powers to zone but may not interfere 
 
 321. Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of San Mateo, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 159, 162 (Ct. App. 
1995). 
 322. Milan Twp. v. Jaworski, No. 240444, 2003 Mich. LEXIS 3105, at *3  (Mich. Ct. App. 
Dec. 4, 2003). 
 323. Tits. I, III(A), VI(A)-(B), infra app. 2 (delineating the legislative purpose, defining 
activities, and establishing the preemption of some local regulations). 
 324. 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 159, 162 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing complaints about noise and potential 
wildfire and erosion, and noting concerns about scenic and aesthetic qualities). 
 325. Id. at 161-62 (observing that the county had decided that neither the state statute nor 
the “regulations adopted thereunder establish[ed] a buffer zone between residential uses and 
timber harvesting.”). 
 326. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 4511–4628 (West 2001 & Supp. 2006).  The court noted that 
“the Legislature had established a comprehensive statutory scheme regulating the conduct of 
timber operations.”  Big Creek Lumber, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 160. 
 327. Id. at 162-63 (observing the regulatory preemption of local regulations concerning the 
conduct of timber operations but not where the operations might take place).  Under the 
California Timberland Productivity Act of 1982, CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 51100–51155 (West 1983 
& Supp. 2005), local governments must zone described timberlands as “timberland production 
zones.”  37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 162-63.  See also CAL. GOV’T CODE  §§ 51104(g), 51112–51113.  
However, for parcels outside of these zones, local controls are possible.  Id. § 51112(d). 
 328. Big Creek Lumber, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 165 (distinguishing timber production zones 
from other areas that contain timber and finding that local governments retain zoning authority 
for these other areas). 
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with production and management activities conducted according to 
generally accepted practices.329 
A local government’s interference with a defendant raising 
pheasants and quail at a hunting preserve was considered by a 
Michigan appellate court in Milan Township v. Jaworski.330  The 
defendant defied a local ordinance and continued to raise game birds, 
leading the township to seek injunctive relief for a “nuisance per 
se.”331  A trial court agreed, and the defendant was enjoined from 
“selling the right to hunt game birds on its property.”332  On appeal, 
the defendant alleged error in the court’s finding that the ordinance 
was not preempted by the Michigan Right to Farm Act.333  The 
appellate court found the preserve qualified as a farm operation334 and 
there was a direct conflict between the local ordinance and the state 
law.335  The local ordinance was preventing the defendant from 
running a farm operation protected by the state right-to-farm law.336  
Due to the state preemption provision, the contrary local ordinance 
was not applied.337  Similar to the Michigan right-to-farm law, ULPA 
would preclude a local ordinance from interfering with the operation 
of a hunting preserve.338 
The preemption of local ordinances by state laws has become a 
significant issue.339  In the absence of preemption, local governments 
 
 329. Tit. VI(A), infra app. 2. 
 330. No. 240444, 2003 Mich. App. LEXIS 3105, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2003).  The 
hunting preserve, owned by a limited liability company, was licensed by the state Department of 
Natural Resources.  Id. at *1-3.  The enforcement action ensued after the local government 
rejected the defendant’s application for a special use permit and the defendant continued its 
operations.  Id. at *2. However, the local government contended a special permit was required 
because the defendant was charging a fee that rendered the preserve a “commercial recreational 
area.”  Id. at *3. 
 331. Id. 
 332. Id. (finding no preemption by the state right-to-farm law). 
 333. Id. at *16 (considering the preemption offered by MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
286.474(6)). 
 334. Id. at *10-12 (analyzing the Michigan right-to-farm law’s definitions for farm and farm 
operation, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 286.472(a)-(b) (West 2003)). 
 335. Id. at *16-17. 
 336. Id. at *16-17 (disagreeing with the government that defendant’s game preserve was a 
recreational area because it qualified under the right-to-farm law as a farm operation). 
 337. Id. 
 338. Tit. VI(A)-(B), infra app. 2. 
 339. See Alexandra Manchik Barnhill, Note, Entrenching the Status Quo: The Ninth Circuit 
Uses Preemption Doctrines to Interpret CERCLA as Setting a Ceiling for Local Regulation of 
Environmental Problems, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 487, 513-28 (2004) (addressing the preemption of 
local authority concerning hazardous waste cleanup); Jeffrey A. Berger, Comment, Phoenix 
Grounded: The Impact of the Supreme Court’s Changing Preemption Doctrine on State and 
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may take actions that undermine state policy.340  ULPA follows the 
Michigan right-to-farm law to preclude local governments from 
interfering with production and management activities conducted 
according to generally accepted practices.341  Production and 
management activities include those conditions and pursuits that are 
defined as activities by the act.342  This should assist landowners of 
undeveloped lands in continuing activities associated with the use of 
their lands. 
At the same time, local governments are not completely 
precluded from regulating significant local problems.343  Title VI(C) 
allows local governments to prescribe standards regarding the 
 
Local Impediments to Airport Expansion, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 941, 991-92 (2003) (advocating a 
liberal preemption stance to limit local and state interference with airport expansion); Emily 
Chiang, Think Locally, Act Globally: Dormant Federal Common Law Preemption of State and 
Local Activities Affecting Foreign Affairs, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 923, 979-92 (2003) (advocating 
a doctrinal test for dormant federal common law preemption of actions affecting foreign 
affairs); Paul Stephen Dempsey, Local Airport Regulation: The Constitutional Tension Between 
Police Power, Preemption & Takings, 11 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 17-20 (2002) (analyzing 
federal preemption over airports and how it interacts with local controls concerning noise); 
Emily V. Griffen, Comment, “Relations Stop Nowhere”: ERISA Preemption of San Francisco’s 
Domestic Partner Ordinance, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 459, 482-83 (2001) (evaluating how the federal 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act preempts local ordinances requiring benefits for 
domestic partners to be the same as for married co-workers); Robert Stumberg, Preemption & 
Human Rights: Local Options after Crosby v. NFTC, 32 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 109, 119-27 
(2000) (considering the preemption of state laws that attempt to boycott goods from foreign 
countries with human rights violations); Valerie Watnick, Federal Preemption of Tort Claims 
Under FIFRA: The Erosion of a Defense, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 419, 430-54 (2003) 
(discussing the judicial elimination of preemption under the Federal Fungicide, Insecticide, and 
Rodenticide Act for certain tort claims); Paul S. Weiland, Comment, Federal and State 
Preemption of Environmental Law, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 285 (2000) (evaluating 
preemption in general on local efforts to protect the environment to advocate allowing different 
“levels of government to take the lead in formulating and implementing environmental law”).  
See also Blanton v. Amelia County, 540 S.E.2d 869, 875 (Va. 2001) (finding a county’s 
ordinances to be void and unenforceable due to conflict with state law). 
 340. See, e.g., J-II Invs. Inc. v. Leon County, 908 So.2d 1140, 1141 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) 
(finding that the right-to-farm law prevented local governments from adopting ordinances 
relating to agriculture but did not preclude enforcing ordinances in place); In re Proesch, 44 P.3d 
1173, 1179 (Idaho 2002) (observing that the Idaho right-to-farm law precludes the adoption of 
ordinances or resolutions declaring activities conducted in accordance with generally recognized 
agricultural practices to be a nuisance); Belvidere Twp. v. Heinze, 615 N.W.2d 250, 254-55 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (finding the Michigan right-to-farm law, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
286.474(6), preempts township zoning restrictions on agricultural practices). 
 341. Tit. VI(A), infra app. 2 (preempting local ordinances, regulations, or resolutions that 
limit production and management activities on undeveloped lands so long as they are conducted 
according to generally acceptable practices).  See also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 286.474(6) 
(West 2003 & Supp. 2006). 
 342. Id. tit. III(A).  See also Centner, supra Part C.1. (defining activities covered by ULPA). 
 343. Tits. IV(A), VI(C), infra app. 2. 
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keeping of a diseased plant or animal which is injurious to human 
welfare or health.344  Local governments are also free to regulate 
waste materials creating an injurious condition to public health as 
delineated by title VI(A)(4).345 
G. Litigation Expenses 
Title VII enumerates provisions whereby the costs of litigation 
can be shifted to persons initiating unsuccessful lawsuits.346  This idea 
is adopted from several different right-to-farm laws.347  Due to the 
costs of litigation, an ungrounded lawsuit against a property owner 
may lead to the demise of a land resource.348  A defendant may be so 
 
 344. Id.tit. VI(C).  This provision is slightly different from the exceptions to the anti-
nuisance protection provided by title IV(A)(3).  Id. app. 2.  Title IV allows nuisance lawsuits 
concerning diseased plants and animals and for harboring pests.  Id.  Local governments may 
continue to regulate local diseased plants and animals, but are precluded from regulating pests.  
Id. tit. VI(C).  Justification for this differentiation may be gleaned from examining the local 
ordinance considered in Kupke v. Orange County, 838 So.2d 598, 599 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).  
The county cited a farmer for violating a local ordinance, with evidence suggesting that there 
was concern that rats and snakes were creating a nuisance.  Kupke, 838 So.2d at 599.  For 
agricultural and forestry producers, most pests should not be a problem as producers will 
control pest infestations to enhance production and profits.  Moreover, pests that cause diseases 
can be regulated.  Therefore, there is no overriding justification for allowing local ordinances 
controlling pests on undeveloped lands.  However, states continue to have authority to regulate 
pests. Tit. IV(A)(3), infra app. 2. 
 345. Id. tit. IV(A)(4). 
 346. Id. tit. VII.  This alters liability law by adopting a “plaintiff pays” policy for 
unsuccessful plaintiffs.  Concern over frivolous lawsuits has led legislatures to craft unbalanced 
fee-shifting provisions weighted toward the interests of particular categories of plaintiffs.  See 
Markita D. Cooper, Job Reference Immunity Statutes: Prevalent But Irrelevant, 11 CORNELL J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 1, 37-38 (2001) (discussing a fee-shifting statute for challenges concerning 
employment references); Edward F. Sherman, From ‘Loser Pays’ to Modified Offer of Judgment 
Rules: Reconciling Incentives to Settle with Access to Justice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1863, 1870 (1998) 
(analyzing the premise that “loser pays” rules encourage settlements). 
 347. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-3.5-102(3) (West 2005); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
70/4.5 (West 2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-10-25.6 (2004); TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 
251.004(b) (Vernon 2004 & Supp. 2006); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 823.08(3)(c)(2) (West 1994 & Supp. 
2005).  A Wisconsin case involving a suit against a defendant for nuisance involving the use of 
fertilizer in a cranberry bog also shows why ULPA incorporates provisions on litigation 
expenses.  LeVake v. Zawistowski, No. 02-C-0657-C, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4916, at *5-10 (W. 
D. Wis. Mar. 12, 2004).  Lakefront property owners sued the cranberry farmer for causing algae 
growth in the waters adjacent to their properties.  Id. at *2.  The court found insufficient 
evidence supporting the plaintiffs’ claims, and dismissed the case.  Id. at *3-5.  The defendant 
sought attorney fees and costs under the state right-to-farm law.  Id. at *5 (citing WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 823.08).  The lack of jurisdiction precluded an award under the right-to-farm law, but 
the court was able to award costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1919 (2000) due to the lack of justification in 
bringing the suit.  LeVake, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4916, at *7-10. 
 348. Fee-shifting generally might be adopted for situations where individuals bring 
unmeritorious suits to extract settlements.  See Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence 
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overwhelmed by a lawsuit, or may incur so many expenses, that 
defending the claim is not a reasonable response.349  Thus, an 
aggressive plaintiff might cause undeveloped lands to be taken out of 
use without winning a lawsuit.350 
To counter the possibility of a plaintiff advancing an unjustified 
lawsuit, ULPA provides that a prevailing defendant will recover the 
aggregate amount of litigation expenses determined by the court to 
have been reasonably incurred in the defense of the nuisance action, 
together with a reasonable amount for attorney fees.351  Litigation 
expenses are to include court costs and litigation costs.352  Moreover, 
no bad faith on the part of the plaintiff is required for the recovery of 
expenses and fees.353 
However, ULPA title VII offers a limitation to circumscribe 
liability for expenses and fees through a more descriptive definition of 
a prevailing defendant.354  A prevailing defendant is defined as a 
defendant in whose favor a final court order or judgment is 
rendered.355  Therefore, a prevailing defendant does not include a 
defendant who entered into a negotiated settlement agreement.356  
Moreover, a defendant who takes corrective or other action to reduce 
an aggravating situation prior to a final court order or judgment 
would not qualify as a prevailing defendant.357 
 
Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 588 
(1997) (observing that fee-shifting might be desirable if it discouraged suits that were unlikely to 
succeed, but not finding strong support that fee-shifting reduces the number of lawsuits). 
 349. See Paster, supra note 106, at 300 (concluding that a nuisance lawsuit can adversely 
affect agricultural operations). 
 350. See id.; See also Tom Daniels, WHEN CITY AND COUNTRY COLLIDE: MANAGING 
GROWTH IN THE METROPOLITAN FRINGE 220 (Island Press, 1999) (identifying increased 
liability insurance fees as an expense facing owners of lands near development). 
 351. Tit. VII(A), infra app. 2 (adopting the recovery provisions from the Illinois and 
Wisconsin right-to-farm laws, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/4.5 (West 2002), WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 823.08(3)(c)(2) (West 1994 & Supp. 2005)). 
 352. Id. tit. VII(C).  This may differ from how a state views such costs.  See Vicencio v. 
Lincoln-Way Builders, Inc., 789 N.E.2d 290, 295 (Ill. 2003) (differentiating court costs from 
litigation costs). 
 353. Tit. VII, infra app. 2.  Other statutes providing remuneration for prevailing defendants 
may contain a requirement that payment is only due if the plaintiff acted in bad faith.  See 
Boeckenhauer v. Joe Rizza Lincoln Mercury, No. 2-04-1213, 2005 Ill. App. LEXIS 1043, at *8-
14 (Ill. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2005) (considering the issue of whether bad faith was required to award 
attorneys fees under a consumer fraud statute). 
 354. Tit. VII(B), infra app. 2. 
 355. Id. (incorporating a requirement for a prevailing defendant from the Illinois right-to-
farm law, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/4.5 (West 2002)). 
 356. Id. 
 357. Id. 
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A further definition of litigation expenses is also set forth to 
guide parties and judges.358  Litigation expenses mean the sum of the 
costs, disbursements and expenses, including reasonable attorney, 
expert witness and engineering fees necessary to prepare for or 
participate in an action in which an activity is alleged to be a 
nuisance.359 
CONCLUSION 
Anti-nuisance provisions have been a prominent feature of 
nuisance law for more than twenty years.  While the right-to-farm 
laws have generally provided appropriate resolutions for competing 
property interests regarding family farms, agriculture and society 
have markedly changed.  Massive consolidation of agricultural 
production has created concentrations of animals and supporting 
input and processing facilities.  These agricultural enterprises are 
quite different from the family farms that were considered as a 
justification for the right-to-farm legislation.360  Right-to-farm laws 
offering protection to such facilities may not reflect the feelings of the 
majority and may not constitute a good resolution for competing 
interests.361 
Changed circumstances and judicial rulings on constitutional 
proscriptions mean that the future of some right-to-farm laws may be 
in doubt.362  By protecting commercial facilities that generate major 
negative externalities, the laws may no longer offer an appropriate 
resolution for conflicting interests.363  Simultaneously, there is a need 
to offer greater protection for undeveloped lands and natural 
resources.364  ULPA incorporates an anti-nuisance paradigm based 
upon an economy of nature to provide new protection for farmland, 
forests, and natural areas without impacting right-to-farm laws.365  
With the adoption of ULPA, a state’s right-to-farm law may change 
or be repealed without affecting the anti-nuisance protection 
 
 358. See id. tit. VII(C). 
 359. Id. (incorporating a description of expenses from WIS. STAT. ANN. § 823.08(3)(c)(2) 
(West 1994 & Supp. 2005)). 
 360. See Walker, supra note 15, at 489 (commenting on the significance of family farms and 
encroaching suburbanization with respect to the adoption of the Michigan right-to-farm law). 
 361. See supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text. 
 362. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text. 
 363. See supra note 5. 
 364. See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text. 
 365. Tits. I, II, infra app. 2. 
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accorded to the state’s land resources.  Owners of undeveloped lands 
will have greater protection against nuisance lawsuits for production 
and management activities conducted according to generally accepted 
practices.366 
 
 366. Id. tit. II. 
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APPENDIX 1: STATE RIGHT TO FARM LAWS 
State State Codifications 
Alabama ALA. CODE § 6-5-127 (LexisNexis 2005) 
Alaska ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.235 (2004) 
Arizona ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-111 to -112 (2005) 
Arkansas ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-4-107 (1996 & Supp. 2005) 
California CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3482.5-.6 (West 1997 & 
Supp. 2006) 
Colorado COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-3.5-102 (West 
2005) 
Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-341 (West 2003 
& Supp. 2006) 
Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 1401 (2001) 
Florida FLA. STAT. ANN. § 823.14 (West 2000 & Supp. 
2006) 
Georgia GA. CODE ANN. § 41-1-7 (1997 & Supp. 2006) 
Hawaii HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 165-1 to -6 
(LexisNexis 2000 & Supp. 2005) 
Idaho IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 22-4501 to -4504 (2001 & 
Supp. 2006) 
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 22-4801 to -4804 (2001 & 
Supp. 2006) 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 22-4803A (Supp. 2006) 
Illinois 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/1 to /5 (West 
2002) 
Indiana IND. CODE ANN. § 32-30-6-9 (West 1999 & 
Supp. 2006) 
Iowa IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 172D.1-.4 (West 1999 & 
Supp. 2006) 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 352.11 (West 2001 & Supp. 
2006) 




KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-3201 to -3203 (2001) 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1505 (2000) 
Kentucky KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.072 (West 2005) 
Louisiana LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3:3601-:3609 (2003) 
Maine ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2805 (2006) 
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Maryland MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-403 
(LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2006) 
Massachusetts MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 111, § 125A (West 2004 
& Supp. 2006) 
MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 243, § 6 (West 2003 & 
Supp. 2006) 
Michigan MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 286.471-.474 (West 
2003 & Supp. 2006) 
Minnesota MINN. STAT. ANN. § 561.19 (West 200 & Supp. 
2006) 
Mississippi MISS. CODE ANN. § 95-3-29 (2004) 
Missouri MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.295 (West 2000 & Supp. 
2006) 
Montana MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-30-101 to -105 (2005) 
Nebraska NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 2-4401 to -4404 (1997 & 
Supp. 2005) 
Nevada NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.140(2) (2002) 
New Hampshire N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 432:32-:35 (2002) & 
Supp. 2006) 
New Jersey N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 4:1C-1 to -10 (West 1998 & 
Supp. 2006) 
New Mexico N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-9-1 to -7 (LexisNexis 
1999 & Supp. 2003) 
New York N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW §§ 308, 308-a 
(McKinney 2004 & Supp. 2006) 
North Carolina N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701 (2000 & Supp. 2005) 
North Dakota N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 42-04-01 to -05 (1999 & 
Supp. 2005) 
Ohio OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 929.04 (West 1994 & 
Supp. 2006) 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.13 (West 2006) 
Oklahoma OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 20-18 (West Supp. 
2006) 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1.1 (West 2000 & 
Supp. 2006) 
Oregon OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.930-.947 (2005) 
Pennsylvania 3 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 951-954 (West 1995 & 
Supp. 2006) 
Rhode Island R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 2-23-1 to -7 (1998 & Supp. 
2005) 
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South Carolina S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 46-45-10 to -70 (1987 & 
Supp. 2005) 
South Dakota S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 21-10-25.1 to -25.6 
(2004) 
Tennessee TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 43-26-102 to -103 (2000 & 
Supp. 2005) 
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 44-18-101 to -104 (2000 & 
Supp. 2005) 
Texas TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. §§ 251.001-.006 
(Vernon 2004 & Supp. 2006) 
Utah UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-38-7 to -8 (2002) 
Vermont VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 5751-5753 (2002 & 
Supp. 2006) 
Virginia VA. CODE §§ 3.1-22.28, .29 (1994) 
Washington WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.48.300-.310 (West 
1992 & Supp. 2005) 
West Virginia W. VA. CODE §§ 19-19-1 to -5 (2004) 
Wisconsin WIS. STAT. ANN. § 823.08 (West 1994 & Supp. 
2005) 
Wyoming WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 11-39-101 to -104 (2005) 
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 11-44-101 to -103 (2005) 
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APPENDIX 2: UNDEVELOPED LANDS PROTECTION ACT 
I.  Legislative Purpose of the Act 
A.  It is the declared policy of this state to encourage the use of 
lands for farmlands, forests, and natural areas while also conserving 
and protecting these resources.  Lands used for the production of 
food, fiber, agricultural, horticultural, aquacultural, and forestry 
products involve the productive use of the state’s resources.  Equally 
important are the state’s natural areas.  Farmlands, forests, and 
natural areas, hereafter referred to as “undeveloped lands,” 
constitute unique and irreplaceable resources of statewide 
importance, and the protection and preservation of these lands will 
result in a general benefit to the health and welfare of people in the 
state. 
B.  It is the further purpose of this act to protect undeveloped 
lands used for cleansing air and water resources, scenic vistas, and 
outdoor recreational activities for their continued use as ecological 
and natural resources. 
1.  Open fields, pastures, forests, and natural areas are 
important to tourism and the quality of life of people in the state. 
2.  The production of agricultural commodities and forestry 
products are basic industries that are important to the health and 
welfare of the people and to the economy.  Sound agricultural and 
silvicultural industries require the efficient and profitable use of water 
and energy and many other natural, commercial, and industrial 
resources. 
3.  A lack of adequate and informed consideration of 
natural resources, their relationship to the state’s economy, and the 
need to sustain activities on undeveloped lands has caused problems 
for agricultural production in this state. 
C. The legislature finds that urban encroachment and the 
development and construction of structures on undeveloped lands 
consisting of farmlands, forests, and natural areas often diminish the 
long-term ability of the land and appurtenant lands to be maintained 
in natural productive uses. 
1. The sustained long-term use of undeveloped lands may 
be achieved by avoiding development that leads to fragmentation of 
parcels.  Fragmentation begets interferences that may lead to the 
further demise of undeveloped lands. 
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2. Conflicts between urban land uses and activities on 
undeveloped lands threaten the demise of important natural 
resources.  Subsequent nuisance lawsuits may encourage or force the 
premature demise of the current productive capacities and 
significantly interfere with the inherent agronomic qualities and 
ecological values of these lands. 
D.  It is therefore the purpose of this act to limit the 
circumstances under which farmlands, forests, and natural areas may 
be deemed a nuisance. 
II.  The Protection 
A.  People who locate on or near areas used as farmlands, 
forests, and natural areas must accept the conditions commonly 
associated with living in the particular setting.  It is the policy of this 
state that farmlands, forests, and natural areas are protected; 
therefore, necessary activities are allowed to continue.  To qualify 
under this act, an activity on undeveloped lands, as defined by the act, 
must be conducted according to “generally accepted practices.” 
B.  No activity on undeveloped lands shall become a private or 
public nuisance after two years from its established date of the 
activity as a matter of law if the activity is conducted in conformity 
with the provisions of all applicable federal, state, and local laws, 
regulations, rules, ordinances, and permits and according to generally 
accepted practices. 
C. An activity on undeveloped lands is entitled to a rebuttable 
presumption that it does not constitute a nuisance if the activity is 
conducted in conformity with the provisions of all applicable federal, 
state, and local laws, regulations, rules, ordinances, and permits and 
according to generally accepted practices. 
D.  No activity on undeveloped lands shall be found a public or 
private nuisance as a result of changed conditions in or around the 
locality of the land or water resource if the activity has been in such 
use for one year or more and if the activity was not a nuisance at the 
time it began. 
III.  Definitions 
A.  “Activities” refer to: 
1. Conditions and pursuits associated with the production 
of agricultural, aquacultural, and silvicultural products and the 
management of production areas for continued agronomic objectives.  
Activities include, but are not limited to, fertilizer application, weed 
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and pest control, planting, cultivating, reforesting, on-site composting, 
drainage, mowing, harvesting, land clearing, insect and disease 
control, constructing ponds associated with a farming or aquacultural 
operation, thinning, fire protection, and fence maintenance.  An 
activity may be accompanied by odors, noise, air particulates, use of 
chemicals, and the lawful impairment of waters, except as otherwise 
provided. 
2.  Conditions and pursuits associated with natural areas 
including, but not limited to, those for the protection, management, 
and development of scenic, outdoor recreational, cultural, historic, 
archaeological, educational, and ecological resources. 
B.  “Farmlands” mean parcels greater than ten acres that are 
devoted primarily to the production of crops, livestock, aquacultural, 
horticultural, or other agricultural commodities, and include, but are 
not limited to, lands used for field crops, vineyards, orchards, groves, 
vegetable and fruit crops, pastures, areas without roofed structures 
for holding farm animals, water bodies for the production of 
aquacultural products, ponds, small lakes, forestry areas, and natural 
areas appurtenant thereto. 
C.  “Forests” mean parcels greater than ten acres that are used 
for the production of timber and related fiber crops.  Forestry 
production activities include timber harvest, site preparation, slash 
disposal including controlled burning, tree planting, pre-commercial 
thinning, fertilization, animal damage control, reasonable water 
resource management, insect and disease control in forest land, and 
any other generally accepted, reasonable, and prudent practice 
normally employed in the management of a timber resource for 
monetary profit. 
D. “Generally accepted practices” mean reasonable and 
prudent methods for the activities being conducted in a county or 
contiguous county in which a nuisance claim is asserted. 
1.  Generally accepted practices will include, but not be 
limited to, those practices necessary for the on-site production and 
preparation of agricultural or forestry commodities, such as the 
operation of equipment, proper use of pesticides, air and water 
quality control, noise control, fertilizer application, labor practices, 
and crop protection methods. 
2. Practices that are commonly or reasonably associated 
with agronomic production and activities in conformity with federal, 
state, and local laws and regulations are presumed to be conducted 
according to generally accepted practices. 
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E.  “Manure” is organic matter from farm animals used as 
fertilizer in agriculture, and shall include poultry litter.  Poultry litter 
is excreted manure from avian species mixed with bedding material.  
Manure contributes to the fertility of the soil by adding organic 
matter and nutrients. 
F.  “Natural areas” mean parcels greater than ten acres which 
have retained their natural, undeveloped character, although not 
necessarily completely undisturbed, including lands which are 
important in preserving archaeological or cultural resources, 
ecosystems, flora, fauna, geological, open space, natural historical, 
scenery, wildlife habitat, wetlands, or similar features of scientific or 
educational value. 
G.  “Undeveloped lands” include farmlands, forests, and 
natural areas in parcels that are greater than ten acres.  These lands 
may be used for farming, outdoor recreational activities, hunting, 
forestry, scenic views, and ecological functions.  Undeveloped lands 
cannot have any structure used for human habitation, building used 
for confined animal production, nor any building used for a 
commercial purpose that is not directly related to use of the land as 
farmland, forest, or a natural area.  Outhouses, lean-to shelters, 
historical and educational structures, and minor farm outbuildings are 
permitted on undeveloped lands.  Nonqualifying buildings or paved 
areas on plots connected to farmlands, forests, or natural areas may 
be deemed to be separate parcels that are not covered by the act. 
IV.  Exceptions to the Protection 
A.  Notwithstanding the other provisions of this act, the anti-
nuisance protection accorded by this act shall not apply to: 
1. Any activity conducted in a malicious, improper, or 
negligent manner. 
2.  Any condition not in conformity with any federal, state, 
or local law, ordinance, regulation (including zoning regulations), or 
permit issued by a governmental agency. 
3. The keeping of a diseased plant or animal, or harboring 
a pest, which is injurious to human welfare or health. 
4.  Any condition injurious to public health or safety, 
including but not limited to: (a) an improperly built or improperly 
maintained septic tank, water closet, or privy, (b) untreated or 
improperly treated human waste, garbage, offal, dead animal or waste 
from a slaughtered animal, or (c) dangerous waste material or gas 
which is harmful to human or animal life. 
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B.  Notwithstanding the other provisions of this act, the 
following activities remain subject to nuisance law: 
1. Any building or structure not directly used in 
conjunction with agricultural or silvicultural production or the 
management of scenic, outdoor recreational, cultural, historic, 
archaeological, educational, or ecological resources.  Buildings and 
structures not qualifying under the act include those used for milling 
inputs, manufacturing agricultural and forestry products, or 
processing products. 
2. Any building, pen, or feedlot used for the production of 
confined animals meeting the definition under state law for 
concentrated animal feeding operations. 
3. Any lagoon employed for animal waste, and spray field 
used for disposing liquid or slurry from a lagoon. 
4. The clear-cutting of timber and the development of 
roads. 
5.  The production of crops or forestry products involving 
the aboveground application or storage of sewage sludge. 
C.  Any activity on lands within an incorporated city. 
V.  Retained Rights 
A.  Notwithstanding the other provisions of this act, any person, 
firm, or corporation retains the right to recover damages for injuries 
sustained on account of: 
1. Any activity conducted in violation of any federal, state 
or local statute or governmental regulation, permit, or court order. 
2.  Any pollution of, or change in conditions of, the waters 
of any stream or on account of any discharge, overflow, or trespass. 
3.  Any tort for which the attractive nuisance doctrine 
grants a cause of action. 
B.  Notwithstanding the other provisions of this act, this act 
shall not affect the right of any agricultural producer to apply manure, 
organic crop residuals, or processing by-products to the land at 
agronomic rates as a source of nutrients for plant growth. 
1.  For manure application to meet the agronomic rate 
requirement, the producer must develop and implement a nutrient 
management plan that incorporates application rates for manure that 
minimize phosphorus and nitrogen transport from the field to surface 
waters in compliance with technical standards for nutrient 
management. 
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2.  Technical standards shall include a field-specific 
assessment of the potential for nitrogen and phosphorus transport 
from the field to surface waters, and address the form, source, 
amount, timing, and method of application of nutrients on each field 
to achieve realistic production goals, while minimizing nitrogen and 
phosphorus movement to surface waters. 
VI. Local Governments 
A.  Except as provided in title VI(C), this act preempts any 
local ordinance, regulation, or resolution that limits production and 
management activities on undeveloped lands conducted according to 
generally accepted practices. 
B. Production and management activities on undeveloped 
lands include only those conditions and pursuits as defined as 
activities by title III(A). 
C.  A local unit of government may prescribe standards 
regarding: 
1.  The keeping of a diseased plant or animal which is 
injurious to human welfare or health. 
2. A condition injurious to public health or safety 
delineated by title IV(A)(4). 
VII. Litigation Expenses 
A.  In any nuisance action in which an activity on undeveloped 
lands covered by this act is alleged to be a nuisance, a prevailing 
defendant shall recover the aggregate amount of litigation expenses 
determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred in the 
defense of the nuisance action, together with a reasonable amount for 
attorney fees. 
B. For the purposes of this act, a prevailing defendant is a 
defendant in a lawsuit in whose favor a final court order or judgment 
is rendered.  A defendant shall not be considered to have prevailed if, 
prior to a final court order or judgment, he or she enters into a 
negotiated settlement agreement or takes any corrective or other 
action that renders unnecessary a final court order or judgment. 
C.  Litigation expenses mean the sum of the costs, 
disbursements, and expenses, including reasonable attorney, expert 
witness, and engineering fees necessary to prepare for or participate 
in an action in which an activity is alleged to be a nuisance. 
